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ABSTRACT
TECHNICAL CHANGE AND PROFITABILITY:
THE LONG-PERIOD BEHAVIOR OF TIC RATE OF PROFIT
by
BENIGNO VALDES
University of New Hampshire, September 1986
This dissertation provides a theoretical inquiry into the effects
of technical change on profitability. In the center of the dis
cussion lies the Marxian ‘Law of the Falling Tendency of the
Rate of Profit* (LFTRP). The LFTRP maintains that mechani
zation, i.e. the introduction of cost-reducing techniques of the
capttal-ustng-laba^savtrig type, results In a lower average rate
of profit. This proposition is denied by the Oklshlo theorem,
which says that the introduction of such techniques is incom
patible with a falling rate of profit.
In order to evaluate Oklshlo's claim, a model of the econ
omy which incorporates fixed capital is constructed, and on Its
basis the following THEOREM is proven: In the presence of
fixed capital. If (I) capitalists choose Innovations which lower
the unit cost of production, and (11) the Introduction of more
mechanized techniques raises the Investment cost per unit of
output, then the effects of mechanization upon the average rate
of profit are theoretically indeterminate. Therefore, Oklshlo*s
claim is not generally valid.
VD

A COROLLARY of this theorem provides the necessary con
dition under which the LFTRP will actually hold. The condition
is the following: For mechanization to lower the average rate at
pratltt it must also lower same or all at the transitional rotes
of praftt. [The transitional rote of profit is that which an inno
vative capitalist would obtain at ruling prices.)
This corollary raises an important question: is there any
possibility that the 'necessary condition' will be attained in the
real world? Traditional teachings suggest that there Is none, as
those teachings assume that it would be "irrational" for any
capitalist to introduce a more mechanized technique so long as
It reduces his transitional rate of profit. Against this tradition.
It is shown that competition might force the introduction of
mere mechanized techniques even if this Implies a lower tran
sitional rate of profit. This formulation of the problem is then
compared with other treatments of the same sdbject in which
the Oklshlo theorem is shown to be valid. It is argued that those
treatments are inappropriate. The dissertation ends with a sum
mary of the economic and political Implications of the study.

VIII

INTRODUCTION
Whenever capitalism undergoes a serious economic recession,
economists and politicians are quick to point out the reason,
namely, that the rate of investment is lower than it used to be.
When capitalists are asked what may be the cause for the lower
rate of investment, their answer is always the same: the rate of
investment is lower because so is the rate of profit. Therefore,
economic crises appear to be the result of falling profitability.
The question is, how does this fall in profitability arise? Basi
cally, there are two contending explanations. One asserts that
falling profitability Is the result of a rising wage bill. The
essential argument is this: in periods in which the strength of
the labor movement increases greatly, wages tend to rise faster
than productivity and hence the share of profits in national
income tends to be "squeezed11 by the rising share of wages.
Thus, the rate of profit falls because wages rise too much. This
explanation is called the "proflt-squeezB theory of crisis."*
The alternative explanation sees the cause of falling profit
ability in the profit-seeking nature of capitalism. The basic
argument Is as follows. The urge for profit causes capitalists to
engage in competition against each other. In the struggle, the
immediate goal of each participant Is to drive her rivals from
the field and capture their share of the market. Different
methods, such as advertising and even some forms of sabotage,
are used with that intention. In the end, however, one capitalist

can secure a larger share of the market only by selling more
cheaply than the other competitors, and to do so without suffer
ing losses, by producing more cheaply. This is achieved by
raising the productivity of labor with the continual mechani
zation of production. For the capitalists who move first to adopt
the new technique, the lower cost of production, the lower price
and the larger market share may render a higher profit rate.
However, those factors force the rival capitalists to introduce
the same machines, and once the adoption of the new technique
becomes universal, the combined increase in investment costs
results in a lower average rate of profit. Profitability falls,
therefore, not because workers become less but rather more
productive. This is Marx's "law of the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall." (We shall refer to it as LFTRP.)
The dispute between these two crisis theories has some
serious political implications. On the one hand, If the "profltsqueeze" argument provides the correct explanation of the
problem, two Interesting questions arise, namely: (1) will the
lessening of class struggle, by government redistribution of in
come for Instance, ensure economic stability In capitalism? (2)
If so, when the economy goes into depression, should workers be
held "responsible" for It? On the other hand. If the LFTRP pro
vides the correct explanation, one must conclude that in capita
lism economic crises are unavoidable: to survive, capitalism
needs mechanization, and mechanization Itself creates the condl2
tlon for economic downturns.

This is one of the most criticized theses in the history of
political economy. Mark Blaqg (1960) and Paul Sweezy (1981)
claim that the LFTRP is flawed because it rests upon the premlse that technical change is capital-biased, whereas, in their
4
opinion, the historical evidence does not suggest so. Nobuo
Oklshlo (1961) offers a further critique. Using a model from
which fixed capital is absent, he concludes that the Introduction
of cost-reducing techniques Is Incompatible with a falling rate
5
of profit. Today most critics of Marx accept this result as a
conclusive refutation of his LFTRP,^ hence of his dictum re
garding the inevitability of economic crises under capitalism.
On the other hand, the LFTRP Is one of the Marxian theses that
7

many hold to be crucial to his system. After all. It was Marx
himself who once referred to It as "from the historical point of
view, the most important law of modern political economy"
(Marx, 1973:748.)
In my opinion, neither side in this dispute provides a cor
rect evaluation of the LFTRP. Those arguments which favor the
original formulation by Marx are either Inaccurate or based on
assumptions which seem to be unwarranted. Often they are also
esoteric. On the other hand, the empirical objections to the
LFTRP, such as those raised by Blaug (1960) and Sweezy
(1981) shed little light on the Issue. Finally, it appears that the
Oklshlo theorem is only valid in the unrealistic world of an
economy without fixed capital. Arguments which generally sqpport the Oklshlo theorem (Persky and Alberro, 1979 , and

Roemer, 1979 and 19811 seem to rely (as already suggested by
Shaikh, 1978b and 1982) on a false Interpretation of two ana
lytical categories used by Marx, namely the idea of competition
and the concept of prices at production.
This calls for a detailed assessment of the LFTRP and we
intend to carry it out in this dissertation. It will be shown that,
from the theoretical point of view, no definite conclusion can
be reached concerning the effects of mechanization upon the
average rate of profit. This Is counter to the existing positions
on the issue. The latter will be analyzed and their defects
clearly pointed out. It will also be shown that we can determine
the conditions under which the LFTRP must hold. These condi
tions will be derived, and the likelihood of their occurrence will
be examined. The expectation Is that, accordingly, the LFTRP
will be situated In its proper theoretical niche.
Methodology
In recent years Marxian political economy has incorporated
the use of modem mathematical techniques, resulting In advan
tages and disadvantages. On the one hand, new theoretical in
sights are to be expected; on the other hand, there will be a loss
In analytical simplicity. Hence, mathematical tools ought to be
used only in so far as they allow us to obtain results which
otherwise would be difficult, or impossible, to derive. Unfortu
nately, this principle Is sometimes forgotten and mathematical
o
esoterlca take precedence over economic fundamentals. We
shall try to avoid such an approach. Even though obscurity has

come to play a major role in the distribution of Intellectual re
spect among economists, our preference is for clarity. Hence,
our main arguments will be conducted m terms of a simple
model of the economy Involving only two sectors: "consumer
goods" (sector 1) and "capital goods" (sector 2.) The reason for
this is simple: while the use of a more disaggregated model
would complicate the arguments greatly, it would not at all in
crease their theoretical substance.
In addition to the above, our analysis will assume that the
real wage remains constant. This assumption Is necessary to
isolate the effects of mechanization upon the rate of profit.
Otherwise, wb would not be able to determine whether the rate
of profit behaves in a particular way due to mechanization alone
or to changes In the real wage. In that case one of our funda
mental goals, namely, to compare the LFTRP and the "profltsqueeze" arguments would be Impossible. Thus, although the
constancy of the real wage Is neither a feature of reality nor a
characteristic of the Marxian model as such, it becomes a nec
essary theoretical device in the analysis of the LFTRP.
Finally, It may prove useful to mention, although It will be
clear by the context, that fixed capital Is not Introduced into our
analysis until we reach Section IV, where it becomes essential
to carry out the argument. Up to that point, nothing substantive
is lost by avoiding the treatment of fixed capital.
Notes
*National income (Y) Is distributed between profits (ID

and wages (W): Y=n+W. From this we have IT/Y=i-W/Y,
whre n/Y is the relative share of profits and W/Y is the
relative share of wages. On the other nand, the rate of profit is
T r=n/K , where K Is the capital stock. Dividing this expression
by Y, we obtain 7r=(l-W/Y)-r(K/Y). Since most empirical es
timations suggest that K/Y (the capltal-output ratio) does not
exhibit a downward trend (see section III below), it follows that
if the wage share (W/Y) increases the profit share (IVY) must
decrease and so must the rate of profit. The "proflt-squeeze"
argument has a long history. It goes back to the French econ
omist Frederic Bastlat in the 1840s and the American Henry
Carey in the 1860s (see Marx, 1973:755.) In its modem form,
it is best represented by Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe (1972)
in Great Britain, and by RafFord Boddy and James Crotty (1975)
in the United States.
2

The thesis that in capitalism economic crises are unavoi
dable Is Marx’s alone. David Ricardo, for instance, also por
trays the capitalist economy as inherently unstable, but in his
model economic instability can be countered. In the Ricardian
explanation, the rate of profit falls due to the existence of
diminishing returns in agrlculture:as population grows with the
development of society, progressively less fertile land has to be
brought into cultivation. Thus, an ever-increasing amount of ca
pital must be used to produce each additional unit of output.
There follows a fall in the rate of profit. Now, without the In
centive to Invest, capitals withdraw from the economy, and this
leads to the stationary state (a situation where investment has
ended.) But Ricardo was optimistic, asserting that the fall In
the rate of profit could be avoided by the continual introduction
of more efficient (I.e., cost-reducing) techniques of production.
(For a detailed mathematical treatment of the Ricardian model
see Paslnettl, 1959:78-92.) Marx, however, rejected the "law"
of diminishing returns in agriculture and wltn it the entire
Ricardian explanation of the stationary state. (The law of dimin
ishing returns in agriculture was one of Marx’s favorite targets
for criticism. See Meek, 1953.) Fear Marx, It was precisely the
introduction of cost-reducing techniques which caused the rate of
profit to fall. Simply put, he turned the Ricardian explanation
on its head.
^It is indeed true that the LFTRP rests in part on this as
sumption (See Section ID below.)
This criticism militates not simply against Marx but also
against the entire theoretical tradition of the 19th century. In
cluding Taussig, J. B. Clark and Bohm-Bawerk, among others
(see Gourvltch, 1940:93-95.) For an analysis of the historical
evidence seemingly favorable to the point of view sqpported by
Blaug and Sweezy, see Fellner (1956:246-47.) The same cri
tique is also raised by Joan Robinson (1957), who modified her

opinion on the matter sometime between 1937 and 1956 (see
her 1956:170, as opposed to her 1937:135.)
It must be mentioned in passing that the Oklshlo theorem,
albeit modem in Its form, Is quite old In Its content. A similar
claim to the one put forth by Oklshlo was made much earlier in
Germany by von Bortklewltz (1907a.) But his paper was not
translated into English until 1952, and that was not the best
time for Western scholars to investigate Marx. In Japan, how
ever, Marxian economics has always found a more favorable
environment (see Itoh, 1980:11-45.) Japanese discussions of
the LFTRP within the framework suggested by Bortklewltz were
offered by Shlbata (1934 and 1939.)Hence, it should not come
as a surprise that the Oklshlo theorem was developed In Japan.
^Consider the following comments by Roemer (1981):
"(The Oklshlo theorem] settles, in a fundamental way, the
Marxian conjecture of a falling rate of profit due to competitive
innovations... It is essentially the era of the classical story1
(p.98); and "there seems to be no hope for the theory of the fall
ing rate of profit within the strict confines of the environment
that Marx suggested as relevant" (p. 12.)
7

The list of authors includes, among others, Paul Matlck
(1969), Samir Amin (1970 and 1975), David Yaffee (1973a
and 1973b), Mario Cogoy (1974), Pierre Boccara (1974),
Ernest Mandel (1975), Ben Fine and Richard Harris (1976 and
1979), Anwar Shaikh (1978a and 1978b), Manuel Castells
(1980) and Join Weeks (1981 and 1982.)
a
This altogether wrong tendency to confuse relevance with
obscurity has been noted by many and criticized by some (see,
for instance, Samuelson, 1981:198; Baumol, 1984:7, and
England (1986.)

$ L THE MARXIAN MODEL
The LFTRP is deeply rooted in the Marxian theory of value and
distribution and hence the cnderstanding of that theory is prior
to any dlsouslon of the LFTRP. This section provides a critical
assessment of the Marxian model as it is laid down in volumes
one and three of Capital (see Marx, 1967.)
Following the classical tradition Marx defines the value of
a commodity as "the labor-tlme socially necessary for its pro*
ductlori' (vol. 1:39.) In saying "labor-tlme socially necessary" he
refers to that which Is "required ureter the normal conditions of
production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity
prevalent at the time" (vol. 1:39.). With this definition of value,
Marx begins with the analysis of a society In which the direct
producers of commodities are in possession of their respective
means of production. Thus we have:
A.1.1 (Assumption 1 o tvo i.l) : The direct producer
of commodities owns the means of production and the
the commodities produced with them.
In those conditions, the producer of a specific commodity
brings to the market a portion of his output and exchanges it for
other commodities which he also needs for his survival. The
proportions In which the commodities are exchanged must coin
cide with those of the labor-tlme socially necessary to produce
them; that is, if the labor-tlme necessary to produce one unit of
commodity A is twice the labor-tlme necessary to produce one

inlt of commodity B, then one w it of A will be exchanged for
two units of B. It is easy to show that this must be so. Suppose
that it were not. For example* let we w it of A be exchanged
for one w it of B: in that case, nobody will produce A. This fol
lows from the knowledge that with half the labor-tlme socially
necessary to produce one w it of A. it is possible to produce one
w it of B, which can then be exchanged in the market for one
w it of A. In general, if the proportions of exchange do not coin
cide with those of the labor-tlme socially necessary to produce
the commodities only one commodity will be produced, namely,
the one which in the market offers the best proportion of ex
change. (Which is absird because If only one commodity is pro
duced there can be no exchange nor, therefore, a market.)*
Now, it is obvious that it would be impossible to carry out
all the necessary transaction If they were to be made by direct
exchange of physical equivalents: one pound of meat for one of
wheat, etc. To activate the process money has been "invented,"
and money is any commodity accepted as means of exchange by
the transactors. Hence, the value of money is determined by the
labor-tlme socially necessary for its production. Therefore, let
us assume that gold is chosen as the money commodity, and that
the labortime socially necessary to produce one unit of it, say
one owce, Is one hour. Also, assume that the production of one
w it of wheat (say one pound) requires two hours to be produced.
Hence, one powd of wheat will be exchanged for two ounces of
gold, and this is called its price. Similarly, If the production of

10

ora pound of meat requires ora hour of socially necessary labortlme, one oince of gold will be Its price. Therefore, inder the
conditions established by A.1.1, the value and the price of a
commodity coincide: the latter is merely the money equivalent
of the former. Hence,
Pj=\j for all l (1=1,..Mn),
where Pj represents the price, and Aj the value, of commodity 1
2
(any ore of the n commodities in the market.)
Marx calls the situation described above, Simple Commo
dity Production. In It, production and exchange have the only end
of satisfying social needs. The producer,
starts with Commodities [C], turns them into Money
[M], and thence once again Into Commodities [C'j.
Commodities constitute the beginning and the end of
the transaction which finds Its rationale In the fact
that the commodities adqulred are qualitatively dif
ferent from those given up. Marx designates this
circuit symbolically as C-M-C' (Sweezy, 1942:57.)
Homogeneous Capitalism
Under capitalism, both the means of production and the
commodities produced with them belong to the oapltallst. The
direct producer owns only his iofcr-power, that is to say, the
potential capacity for laboring in the production of commodities
during a period of time. Far Marx, laboi^powar is a commoty whose value "is determined, as in the case of every other
commodity, by the labor-tlme necessary for [its] production
(Marx, 1967:1:171.) But the production of labor-power is only
possible if the laborer consumes the necessary means of sUbsls-

11
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tence to maintain himself in a normal state. Therefore,
the labor-tlme requisite for the production of laborpower reduces itself to that necessary for the pro
duction of those means of subsistence; in other
words, the value of labor-power is the value of the
means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance
of the labourer (Marx, 1967:1:171.)
In such conditions the worker and the capitalist gp to the
market. In exchange for a sum of money (M), the latter adqulrsG
raw materials, machinery and labor-power (C) from which he
derives, after a process of production is carried out in his facttory, a new commodity (CO. Then he returns to the market with
the new commodity and trades it for another sum of money
(MO. Thus we have the circuit CM-*M,-C'. Here the rationale
C-M-C' is absent because the capitalist starts with one commo
dity and ends with the same one: money. Why does he complete
the circuit at all? Simply because the amomt of money with
which he ends the process (MO Is greater than the amount ad
vanced in Its beginning (M). From the standpoint of the capita
list, production and exchange are meaningful only because they
allow him to obtain a profit. But then, where does this profit
come from? In order to answer this question Marx assumes that
only equivalents in value are exchanged In the market. Hence
no profit can be created In the process of exchange. It follows
that for M' to be greater than M the value of O' must be greater
than the value C. In other words, the capitalist obtains a profit
because the commodity that he sells (CO represents a higher
value than the commodities that he buys (G. This means that it

12

is In the process of prediction (i.e., in the transformation of C
Into CO where profit is created. Now neither machines nor raw
material possess "capacity for laboring." and hence they cannot
contribute to the production of C' with a greater value than their
own (a value which the capitalist has paid.) Thus Marx (1967:1:
209) writes:
[Since] that part of capital (...) represented by the
means of production, by the raw material, auxiliary
material and the instruments of labour, doeG not, in
In the process of production, undergo any quantita
tive alteration of value, 1 call It the constant part of
capital, or mere shortly, constant capital.
Only the labor-power remains to explain the difference of value
between C and C'. Does labor-power add to output a value above
its own? According to Marx, it does. The capitalist who buys
labor-power pays Its exact value. However, during the process
of production he uses the labor-power (I.e., the laborer actually
works) for a period of time which is longer than the necessary
to reproduce its value (I.e., the value of the means of subsis
tence which, in the form of money, the capitalist pays to the
worker.) Hence labor-power adds to the product an increment of
value above its own, so Marx (1967:1:209) writes:
That part of capital, represented by labor-power,
does, in the procsss of production, undergo an alter
ation of value. It both reproduces its own value and
also produces an access, a surplus-value. 1 there
fore call it the variable part of capital, or, shortly,
variable capital.
The surplus-value explains, therefore, the difference of
value between the commodities that the capitalist buys (O and
the commodity that he sells (CO, and this. In turn, explains the

13

difference between the sum of money that he advances (M) and
the sum of money that he finally receives (MO. Therefore*
profit is the money expression of surplus-value.
According to what has been said above* the value Aj of a
commodity 1 (1=1,...,n) can be represented as follows:
*l=cl+vl+sr

M

where Cjls the constant capital* v1 the variable capital, and s1
the surplus-value embodied In one unit of the commodity. Let Xj
be the total output (l.e, the # of units produced) of commodity l
(1=1,...,n). Then Its value Is given by:
A

^ j A

^ i (C j + V j + S j ^

j Cj

+ X j Vj + X j S j ^

j+

V j+ S

j

[2 1

We have seen that the capitalist derives a profitfrom the
use of labor-power. To put it in other words, the capitalist "ex
ploits" the worker. The degree of exploitation is measured by
the rote of arpfas-value, that is * the proportion between the
labor-time that the capitalist does not pay and the labor-tlme
which he does pay to the worker,

For analytical purposes Marx assumes that labor is homogene
ous (i.e.* equally skillful) and mobile as between industries* and
thus he makes e is the same in all sectors of the economy, i.e.**
€j=c for all 1 (1=1*. ..*n)

[4]

We have also seen that profit is the money form of surplus-

14

value. Thus* profit is the outcome of exploitation* and hence It
flows from variable capital (and only from It.) However,
So far as the individual capitalist is concerned. It is
evident that he Is only interested in the relation of
the surplus-value* or the excess value at which he
sells his commodities, to the total capital advanced
for the production of the commodities* while the
specific relationship and lrmer connection of this
surplus with the various components of capital fall
to interest him* and It is, morover, rather In his
interest to draw the veil over this specific rela
tionship and this intrinsic connection (Marx, 1967:
3:43.)
Hence he computes his profit Aj as a percentage

of the total

Investment. That Is, A^PjlCj+Vj). That this profit comes only
from the part of capital invested in labor-power* is not only a
matter which does not concern the capitalist* but It is also one
which he finds difficult to perceive. So long as without the con
stant part of capital, production cannot occur -nor, therefore,
any profit be created- it is reasonable for him to assume that
all the inputs contribute to the creation of profit.
Since A^PjtCj+Vj) and Aj=Sj, we have

p.=---------1 (Cj+Vj)

(1=1*...,n),

(5]

which is the rote of profit in the production of the l-th commo
dity. (Since we implicitly assume a "one commodity-one capita
list" economy, r } is the rate of profit for the l-th capitalist.)
Using [3] and [4], expression [5] can be written as follows:
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p = ---------- =------------ =--------1

(Cj+V j)

Cj

[6]

Qj+1

— +i
V1
where Q = C ^ is the organic composition of capital in the l-th
industry (1=1,....a ), and it measures the degree in which con
stant and variable capital participate in the total Investment. In
itially, Marx assumes that the organic composition is the same
in every industry (hence the denomination homogeneous capital
ism),^ i.e. Qj=Q for all 1 (1=1,...,n.) Consequently,
pj=p for all 1 (1=1,....n).
This means that the rate of profit Is inform across the econ
omy, and in that case the value X1 and the price Pj of commodity
l (1=1,...,n) coincide. This is easy to show. By definition, the
price of a commodity Is the summation of the coGt of production
per unit of output (Cj+Vj) plus a percentage p (the rate of profit)
of the total investment per in t. Since so far we are assuming
that all capital is circulating (there is no fboed capital, i.e. the
turnover period Is unity), the investment cost per unit of output
o
simply coincides with the cost of production per unit. Hence,
Pl= (Cj+Vj) +p (c1+v1)= ( i+p) (Cj+Vj)
The value Xj is given by expression [1], I.e.,
^l=cl+vl+sl

U=l,...,n.)

a=l....*n) [71
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Dividing these two expressions, we obtain:

1+
pl

i+p

s,
1+

S'

= i^ p p X j,

1+

for all 1 (1=1,...,n.)
It follows from above that Homogeneous Capttallsm can be
summarized by the following model:
A .r.1 [Asswnptlm V of vol.i). The direct producers of
commodities own neither the means of production nor the commodotles produced with them. They only own their labor-power.
A.2.1 (Assumption 2 of vol.i). (a) The rate of surplusvalue is uniform across the economy: e.=e for all 1 (1=1,...,n.)
(b) The organic composition of oapltal is also uniform across
the economy: Qj=Q for all 1 (1=1......n.)
Under these circumstances,
(1) The rate of profit Is uniform across the economy: p,=p
for all 1 (1=1,. ...n.)
(2) Commodities are exchanged at their values: p.=X, for
all 1 (1=1,.. .,n.)
(3) The profit obtained by each Individual capitalist Is the
amount of surplus-value generated in his own industry. Thus,
profit Is simply the money-form of surplus-value.
Heterogeneous Capitalism
One of the assumptions of the previous model does not hold
in capitalism as we know it today. That assumption Is A .2.1(b),
fur It Is evident that the organic composition Is not the same In
every Industry. What would happen to the economic 'order* dee-
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exited by tte modal if we let tha organic composition vary from
q

one sector to another? We introduce tha following assumption:
A-1.3 (Assumption i of vol.3)

for some 1 (1=1,..ji)

Under this assumption we have (see expression [6] above)
p=p m general. It follows that capitals of the same magnitude,
but of different Qj’s, will yield different amounts of profit.
Marx explains the reason for this, as follows:
Capitals of the same magnitude operating for the
same worfclng-tlme and with the same degree of ex
ploitation may produce very much different amounts
of profit, because of surplus-value, for the reason
that a difference in the organic composition of capi
tal in different spheres of production implies a dif
ference In their variable part (...), and therefore al
so a difference In the quantities of surplus-labor ap
propriated by them (Marx, 1967:3:149.) Accord
ingly, the rates of profit prevailing in the various
branches of production are arlgtnalfy very different
(Marx, 1967:3:158. Emphasis added.)
Now while this situation Is possible transitorily, in the
long rtn it cannot be maintained "without abolishing the entire
system of capitalist production1 (Marx, 1967:3:153.) For It is
evident that under the logic of capitalism no investor will be
satisfied with a return smaller than the one obtained with the
same capital somewhere else in the economy. Over the longperiod, competition will move the different rates of profit
toward some uniform level a. The long run profit of the l-th
capitalist can thus be expressed by
ApOfCj+Vj)

(1=1

n)

[71

Since ZAj=S, where S is the total surplus-value generated in
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tha economy, we have SApaZlCj+Vjl^lC+V), where C and
V repr esent, respectively, the total constant capital and the to
tal variable capital invested in the economy. It follows that the
uniform (Marx calls it general) rate of profit Is given by
o=

S
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C+V

Substitution of this expression into [7] leads to
S
€V
A.=--------- (C.+V.)-=------- (C.+V.) =
1 C+V
1 1 C+V 1 1

€

(C.+V.) =

c

— +1

S1

C1

(C.+V.)
Vj
1 1

Vj

C
—

V

+1
Q j+ i
S. =
1

C

+1

11

V

Q +i

S , 191
1

+1

where Q=C/V is the social or average organic composition of
capital. If for some 1 (l=i....»n) £^=0, than in that industry it
is Aj=Sj . But this can only happen by chance since in general it
is

by A. 1.3. Thus the profit of the l-th capitalist (1=1.

2,...,n) doe6 not —in general— coincide with the surplus-value
generated In his own Industry. What, then, is the profit of each
Individual capitalist? In order to answer this question, let us
rewrite expression [9] as follows:

19

A

S

c1+v1

C+V

that is.
A
Cl +Vl

S

n
C2+V2

C„+V„
n n

C+V

These equalities tell us that each individual capitalist receives
as profit the corresponding share of the total surplus-value
when this is distributed among all capitalists in proportion to
each one’s individual investments. In other words.
So far as profits are concerned, the various capital
ists are just so many stockholders In a stock com
pany In which the shares of profit are uniformly di
vided per 100, so that profits differ In the case of
the individual capitalists only in accordance with the
amount of capital invested by each in the aggregate
enterprise, i.e., according to his investment in so
cial production as a whole, according to the number
of his shares (Marx, 1967:3:158.)
This is how Marx conceives of the distribution of total
surplus. As Professor Baumol (1974:51-52) puts it.
The substance of Marx’s analysis [of this issue] can
be summarized in a simple parable, in which the
economy is described as an aggregation of industries
each of which contributes [with its surplus-valuB] to
a storehouse containing the total surplus.
The distribution of this social surplus from the "central store
house" is such that
the capitalists of the various spheres of production
(...) do not secure the surplus-valuB (...) created in
their own sphere (...) What they secure is only as
much surplus-value (...) as falls, when uniformly
distributed, to the share of every aliquot part of the
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total social capital from tha total social surplusvalus (...) produced in a given time fay the social ca
pital in all spheres of production. Every 100 of an
invested capital, whatever Its composition, draws as
much profit in a year, or any other period of time,
as falls to the share of every 100 (...) during the
same period (Marx, 1967:3:158.)
Going back to expression [9] we can find the rationale be
hind this. Notice that Aj>Sj when Qj>Q, and Aj<Sj when
Qj<Q. What happens is that In the competitive process that
leads to the formation of the general rate of profit, a transfer
of surplus-value takes place from the low to the high organic
composition sectors. In other words, capttal-lntenstve invest
ments draw more, and labor-intensive Investments draw less,
surplus-value than they themselves generate. Hence, there is a
great incentive for capitalists to mechanize their industries. ^
It has been shown above that the uniform, long-period rate
of profit is (7=S/(C+V). O i the basis of this rate of profit we
can define long-period prices In the usual mamer, I.e.
Pj= (Cj+Vj)+a (Cj+Vj) = (1+a) ( c ^ )

[10]

These prices are in the long run "a prerequisite of sipply, of
the reproduction of commodities11 (Marx, 1967:3:198.), and so
Marx calls them prices of production. They are the "centers of
gravity" of market prices, l.e the level aromd which market
prices fluctuate according to random (short rtn) changes of
supply and demand
It is to be noticed that the prices of production do not co
incide with their corresponding values. This is easy to show.
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Dividing [10] by [1] we have:

i + € ----------

Pi

1+ ---------

C+V

\

vi

1+ecI+v,

Q+i

1+

f

°1+1

where ppXj only i f : (1) €=0, that is, if there is no exploita
tion and hence no profit (which is impossible for every capita
list because it denies the very foundation of capitalism), or (2)
Qj=Q, which may be possible for some industries but not for
all, since

for some 1 (1=1,..,n) by assumption. Hence, in

general value and price do not coincide. If Qj>Q, then p^Xj,
and if QA<fl, then Pj< Xj. ^
The Marxian Method
Some scholars (notably Morlshlma and Catephores, 1978)
have suggested that the three situations discussed above (name
ly, Simple Commodity Production, Homogeneous Capitalism
and Heterogeneous Capitalism) are simple abstract models of
capitalism. In other words, those three analytical stages are
Interpreted as mere theoretical devices to explain a complex
reality (capitalism.) First, a simple model is constructed
(Simple Commodity Production), and then, by relaxing some
assumptions, we move progressively to the concrete object of
our study (Heterogeneous Capitalism.) These scholars see Marx
under the light of their own positivist orthodoxy.
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That is not the Marxian method. If it were, nothing would
distinguish it from that of the neoclassical school, whereas the
main difference between the two approaches to political econ
omy Is essentially methodological. Neoclassical economists
study capitalism without ever questioning where it comes from
and whore it is leading to. This issue doe6 not even make sense
to them, probably because they are convinced that capitalism
does not move at all. In addition to this, they take capitalism
for what It appears to be In Its ''surface.*' That Is to say,
given that the exchange of commodities is the ultimate mani
festation of capitalism, given that exchange has to do with
prices and profits, and given that economic agents relate
through exchanges, the neoclasslcals conclude that the analysis
of capitalism must be done at that level.
Marx saw things m a different way. On the one hand, he
grew ip as a young Hegelian, and this predisposed him to con
sider that nothing is Immutable. Quite the contrary, for him
everything Is a consequence of past realities and is constantly
changing. Thus, the present capitalist system is the result of
changes that took place in a previous system of production,
which, in tum, was the result of the changes occurred in a pre
vious system, and so on. For Marx, the laws governing today's
production, exchange and distribution are not the same as in
previous times, and in order to know today's laws and their
future development we must analyze yesterday's laws and in
vestigate how they evolved. On the other hand, Marx never be-
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llevod that It was possible to analyze capitalism (or anything
also) by focussing only on the kind of phenomena through which
it becomes visible (commodity exchange.) In his view, "if the
essence of things directly coincided with their phenomenal
forms, all science would be superfluous." For him, exchange,
and therefore prices and profits, are the "phenomenal forms”
that hide the true nature of capitalism. On the surface of the
system we have exchange, where everyone trades his commo
dities freely. This applies not only to transactions among ca
pitalists, but also between capitalists and workers. The worker
who sells his labor-power to a capitalist does so voluntarily,
l.e., he is not legally coerced into doing it. Thus, by focussing
exclusively on exchange, capitalism appears as a social system
based on egalitarian relations. However, behind exchange we
have production, where capitalism shows a different face: one
of exploitation of one human being (tha worker) by another (the
capitalist.) Behind the "visible” world of egalitarian exchange
(with prices and profits), there Is tha "invisible” world of ex
ploitative production (with values and surplus-value.) Marx’s
theoretical endeavour tries to bring the two aforementioned
claims to light, namely: (1) that capitalism is indeed moving
under certain laws of Its own, and (2) that one of those laws
is its dependency on the "exploitation” of labor.
In his walysls Marx starts from a situation in which the
direct producers of commodities own the means of production
and the final products. It is also assumed (Implicitly) that the
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organic composition of capital is tha same throughout the econ
omy. Under thaGe circumstances there is no profit attached to
the production and exchange of commodities other than the sa
tisfaction of social needs, and {rices are the money equivalent
of values. Marx calls this situation Simple Commodity Pro
duction, and it is not "fiction" or "scientific hypothesis"; nor is
it a mere "abstraction of capitalism," but the theoretical coun
terpart of a concrete historical reality by which it was pre
ceded, that in which
the labourer owns his means of production, and this
is the condition of the land-owning farmer living off
his own labotr and the craftsman, in the ancient as
well as in the modem world (Marx, 1967:3:177.)
This situation started to change with the first symptoms
of capitalism, when the ownership of the means of production
shifted gradually from the direct producers to the hands of a
few individuals. The form in which this took place is not iden
tical everywhere, but It has some basic features which are
common to every cotrtry. In particular, direct coercion, mar
ket expansion and the subsequent development of a monetary
economy appear to be the basis of the process through which
the direct producers lost ownership of their means of produc
tion. The increasing importance of commerce made feudal land
lords require money rather than ln-klnd contributions from
their peasants. Thus, in order to raise the money required to
pay their rents, the latter became increasingly dependent on
the merchant clients who bought their crops at increasingly
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low prices. That was the moment In which the best situated
peasants as well as the merchants became richer by exploiting
their neighbors through money loans and the purchase of land,
cattle, etc. at unusually low costs. Landless and moneyless,
the majority of the peasants had to emigrate to the cities or to
become hired workers in their villages.
The artisans in the cities were deprived of their work
shops in a similar manner. They owned the means of produc
tion, but not the raw materials; these were controlled by the
merchants. In the beginning, the merchant was a simple inter
mediary In the exchange of commodities between the cities and
the country side, but he soon began to have a say in the organi
zation of production. Provided that the artisans sold their pro
ducts to him at low prices, he was willing to advance money
and raw materials to them. In this way many craftsmen eventu
ally fell into his hands. After becoming the owner of the work
shops, the merchant hired the old owners as simple workers.
Being still a merchant, he also began to be a capitalist. "What
could induce [him] to take an [this] extra business?. Only one
thing: the prospect of greater profit at the same selling price
as the others. And he had this prospect" (Engels, 1967:9045.): By taking the little master into his service, the merchant
capitalist was In fact buying labor-power and appropriating
surplus-value. Under the pressure of an Implacable competi
tion, those artisans who did not submit to the merchants* rule
had to become capitalists themselves. They did so by employ-
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lng as workers those peasants who "landless and moneyless"
were trying to make a living in the cities.
Basically, this is the process through which the class of
'free workers11 was formed. Gathered in the capitalist work
shop, artisans and peasants were all, at the beginning, engaged
in a uniform type of production. It soon became clear, how
ever, that production could be greatly improved by the division
of labor. In this way manufacturing began to flourish. Slowly,
the capitalist form of production put off the remains of the old
system. The ownership of the means of production Is already in
the hands of the capitalists; labor-power has become a commo
dity —end as such is sold and bought in the market, and pro
duction has acquired a purpose beyond the mere satisfaction of
social needs —the creation of profit... This is already capital
ism, but with a distinguishing feature, namely, that the techni
cal base of production can still be considered as (triform. In
those circumstances value and price coincide, the latter being
the money equivalent of the former. It also happens that in
each sector of the economy a mass of value above the valuB
of the inputs consumed in production is created owing to the
use of labor-power. The orpfas-vaiue is farmed in production,
but it only becomes visible in the process of exchange under
the mystified form of p ro fit Henoe, there is no other source of
profit besides the surplus-value. What makes this initial stage
of capitalism peculiar, is the fact that each capitalist retains
in the the form of profit so much surplus-value as Is generated
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In his own industry. This Is the situation described by the our
model of Homogeneous Capitalism. Therefore* this is neither a
‘'scientific hypothesis** nor an abstraction of capitalism "In
general.** Quite the contrary. It is the theoretical counterpart
of a historically determined period of capitalism —that which
corresponds to Its origin and first years of development, when
the technical base still has not underdone important changes and
may be considered the same across the economy.
The industrial revolution completely transformed this situa
tion. Neither the expanding demand for industrial goods, nor the
capitalist drive for profit, could be satisfied with the technical
base of the initial stages of capitalism. There was the need for
a change and this came with the introduction of machinery, first
In England In the 16th century, and then In other European coun
tries and the U.S.A. In the 19th century. However, mechaniza
tion did not take place uniformly. While the textile industries
Introduced machinery on a large scale rather early, "steel and
other heavy industries and mining lagged behind" (see JQrgen
Kuczlnsky, 1972:238), so that the transition to mechanized pro
duction put and end to the wlfarmity of the technical base. This
gave rise to a new stage In the development of capitalism which
is characterized by the unequal composition of capitals in the
various sectors of the economy, and which Marx analyzes in the
third volume of Capital. This Is the situation described by the
model of Heterogeneous Capitalism which, therefore, is not an
abstraction of capitalism "In general*' but of that period of It
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which began with the First Industrial Revolution. From this
analysis Marx concluded that the diversification of the organic
compositions originated fundamental changes in the operation of
capitalism. On the one hand* the diversity of organic composi
tions gives rise to a variety of rates of profit whose equaliza
tion to a uniform rate requires that long ru i leverage) prices
13
deviate from the values of the corresponding commodities.
On the other hand, the profit obtained by each individual capita
list Is not determined in the same way as before. What happens
now Is that the competition among capitalists to place their in
vestments in the more mechanized sectors of the economy cre
ates a transfer of surplus-value between industries. It is this
transfer of surplus-value which levels out the different rates of
profit and ensures a inlform rate far the whole economy. The
Individual capitalist no longer retains as profit the entire mass
of surplus-value generated m his own industry, as it happened
when capitalism was "homogeneous.** Nevertheless It remains
true —according to Marx— that the exploitation of labor is the
only source of surplus-value and this is appropriated exclusively
by the capitalists. This result Is valid, therefore, for every pe
riod In the history of capitalism.
The "Great Contradiction*
Marx considered that the deviation of prices of production
from the values of the corresponding commodities was oily a
logical result of the equalization of the rates of profit —and by
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no means a theoretical flaw in his modal. Nevertheless his opi
nion has been questioned very often. As early as 1895 —that Is
one year after the publication of the third volume of Capital!—
the Italian economist Achlle Lorla stated that Marx's theory of
value was Inconsistent, and a year later Bflhm-Bawerk (1896)
made a sim ilar claim. They both maintained that volumes one
and three of Capital contained two contrdlctlng theories: the
labor theory of value (vol.l) and the theory of prices of produc
tion (vol.3.)
Bflhm-Bawerk's criticism Is based on strictly neoclassical
grounds. What must economic science explain? The rates of ex
change among commodities, I.e. their relative prices. How must
this explanation be carried out? By analyzing exchange as it is
found in typical, concrete market situations. We now know that
Marx's opinion on this matter was very different, but —as
Sweezy (1945:v-xxx) points out— Bflhm-Bawerfc pays no atten
tion to It. He was convinced that the problems concerning him
and his colleagues were the problems which economic science
ought to resolve, so he attributed to Marx the same purposes.
Now from where must the analysis begin? For Bdhm-Bawerfc the
answer was very simple: Given that the exchange of commodi
ties involves their comparison it must be based on something
common to all commodities. According to Marx this "something
common" is labor. Therefore, commodities should be exchanged
according to the quantity of labor Incorporated In each. BflhmBawerfc replies that only commodities vrfilch are the product of
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human effort contain labor. Natural goods such as water* land*
etc. do not contain any labor. Therefore, labor Is not the com
mon element to all commodities, and hence It camot serve as
the basis for their comparison. Now if labor Is not the common
element we are looking for* what is that element? According to
Bflhm-Bawerk it is the u tility that consumers derive from the
goods. Goods have the property of satisfying human needs, and
we assign value to things according to the utility that we extract
from them. Hence the value of a commodity is the monetary ex
pression of the utility that human beings attach to that particu
lar commodity. Far Bflhm-Bawerk, Marx's crucial error was
his failure to understand this phenomenon —a mistake which
annuls any subsequent argumentation. As Sweezy (1945: xlll)
puts it, "It was like a problem in arithmetic: if you find an er
ror in the first line* you know that the answer must be wrong
and that any calculations are worthless." He went on, however*
and tried to prove that even within its own assumptions, Marx's
analysis of value was inconsistent. In doing this* Bflhm-Bawerk
proceeds as follows. Given that most commodities do require
human labor* let us take far granted that labor is the yardstick
of value. In vofi of Capital^ Marx states that prices are equiva
lent to values. Therefore, value proportion coincide with the
proportions of exchange, I.e. A1/Aj=p1/p j (=Oj/Qj)» whre 1 and
j are any two commodities and Qj. Oj represent the quantities
exchanged of them. In this case Marx's model* including his
theory of surplus-value, is entirely consistent.
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However, in vof.3 Marx states that values and prices do not
coincide. Thus Xj/X j ^ p /P j {=Oj /Q j). and hence tha proportions
of exchange cannot be explained by the labor time expended in
the production of the corresponding commodities. There might
seem to be a way in which, despite the difference between val
ues and prices, value proportions can explain the proportions of
exchange. This is so when Pj=orXj for all 1 (1=1,...ji); that Is,
the prlceG of all commodities deviate from their corresponding
values by a constant factor of proportlonalllty, cr>0. However,
within the confines of the Marxian model this possibility has to
be excluded because pj=aXj<=> (l+<r)(c1+v1)=a(c1+v1+s1), from
which we obtain
(l+ a) fcj+v,)
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and since Qj is not uniform, a cannot be uniform either. From
this, BOhm-Bawerfc concludes that Marx’s theory of value is a
complete failure. Moreover, since his theory of exploitation
depends entirely on his theory of value, that theory, too, falls to
the ground. This is how BOhm-Bawerk reaches the following con
clusion: vol.i of Capitol contains a theory which explains rela
tive prices as well as the origin and nature of capitalist profit;
however, that theory depends on a very restrictive assumption:
the equivalence of prices and values, or else, the equality of the
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organic compositions of capital. Once this assumption is re
moved —es it is done in voi.3— the entire theoretical strur
tire of Capitol falls down.
A few years before Bflhm-Bawerfc criticized Marx, Philip
Wlcksteed had shown, based on Jevon’s utility theory, that rela
tive prices could be explained by the ratios of the marginal uti
lities which consumers derive from commodities. Almost at the
same time, Wlcksteed himself and J.B. Clark had developed. In
dependently, the so called Product Exhaustion Theorem, accord
ing to which In the long n n competitive equilibrium, rewarding
each input with Its marginal product precisely exhausts total
output. This they Interpreted as a proof that over the long pe
riod the exploitation of labor is impossible. As J.B. Clark
(1891) put it, 'What every class gets Is, under natural law,
what it contributes to the general output of Industry" —thus
no one Is exploited. Therefore, when Bflhm-Bawerfc wrote his
critique of Marx he was able to offer an alternative theory of
value and distribution.
Why was It Bflhm-Bawerfc and not any other among the many
neoclassical economists of the time, who criticized Marx? This
has an explanation. As Sweezy (1945:vlll-lx) mentions.
Organized socialism in Europe experienced a rapid
growth in the last three decades of the nineteenth
century, and It was during this period that within the
continental Socialism movement Marxism won out
over rival schools and doctrines. Hence, while the
original reaction of the academic world had been to
ignore Marx, it became increasingly difficult to
maintain this attltute; as time went on it became
more and more urgent to organize a cointer attack.
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and BOhm-Bawerfc was in the best position to do it. A member
of the Austrian school,
[he] was from the first a champion of the new mar
ginal utility theory. His two major works. Capital
and htorest and The Positive Theory of Capttal, were
published in 1884 and 1889 respectively, before he
was forty years old; and as the subjective theory of
value spread geographically and gained In popularity,
Bchm-Bawerk’s fame grew by leaps and bounds. By
the turn of the century It is probable that his interna
tional reputation was greater than that of any other
living economist (Sweezy, 1945:vlll.)
In those conditions It was only natural that he led the orthodox
14
argumentation in a very m lltU rt controversy with Marxism.
His critique of Marx soon became famous and In the neoclassi
cal camp It was considered to be a definite blow to the Marxian
system. In such conditions It is not surprising that its English
translation, which appeared two years after the original German
edition, carried the pretentious title of Karl Marx and the Close
of His System —uhlch, as Sweezy (1945:vl) notes, "sounds like
an obituary for Marx and his theories."
That Bohm-Bawerfc had not been fair to Marx was made
clear by Rudolf Hllferdlng (1904). In one of his Introductory pa
ragraphs Hllferdlng says, referring to Bflhm-Bawerk:
Since his criticism deals with principles, since he
does not attack Isolated and arbitrarily selected
points or conclusions, but questions and reflects as
untenable the very foundation of the Marxian system,
possibility Is offered for a fruitful discussion (p. 122)
Hllferdlng starts by pointing out that for Marx the goal of
the eoonomlc analysis of a social order is to discover its laws
of motion. In this light his theory of value is a means to deter-
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mire the Inner processes of capitalist society rather than a
way to ascertain relative prices. In Marx's view, human society
Is articulated around labor, the element whose change In quality
and quantity, organization and productive energy, determines in
the final analysis the development of social life. It Is for this
reason that Marx, by taking the socially necessary labor as the
starting point. Is able to discover society's fundamental laws of
motion. This way economics emerges as a social and historical
science.
Once economic science Is thus understood, the objective is
to analyze the social relationships In which human beings be
come involved through the labor process. Far such a purpose the
study of market phenomena provides little help. If any at all. In
so far as some social relationships whose analysis is crucial
for the understanding of capitalism are established within the
sphere of production, little will be gained by focussing on the
realm of exchange. Likewise, the degree of subjective utility
that Individuals attach to commodities has no analytical power.
Any theory which starts from that category,
Starts from the Individual relationship between a
thing and a human being instead of starting from the
social relationships of human beings one with anoth
er. This envolve6 the error of attempting from the
subjective individual relationship, to deduce an ob
jective social measure. Inasmuch as this individual
relationship Is equally present in all social condi
tions, inasmuch as it does not contain within itself
any principle of change, we must, if we adopt such a
procedure, renoince the hope of discovering the laws
of motion and the evolutionary tendencies or society.
Such an outlook is unhlstorlcal and unsocial. Its cat
egories are natural and eternal categories (Hllfar-
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ding, 1904. For the English translation, p. 122.)
Having made these general remarks, Hllferdlng moves on to
analyze B8hm-Bawerk*s opinion that there Is a fundamental con
tradiction between the first and third volumes of Capital. What
relationship Is there between those two volumes? According to
vol. I commodities are exchanged in proportion to their values,
whereas according to vol.3 they are not. "Who denies It?," says
Hllferdlng. That happens because, as the historical conditions
change, there occurs some modifications in exchange. The ques
tion is whether the law of value still works under the new con
ditions. In other words, are the new relations of exchange regu
lated by the quantity of labor incorporated in each commodity?
If so, the law of value, though In modified form, con
tinues to control exchange and the course of prices.
All that It is necessary Is that we should understand
the course of prices to be a modification of the pre
existing course of prices, which was under direct
control of the law of value (Hllferdlng, 1904. For
the English translation, p. 156.)
In Hllferdlng’s opinion the question posed above has an afIr
rigative answer because although prices and values do not coin
cide, the former are determined by the latter, i.e.

for

all l (1=1,....n; and a^R 4) —so that values and not prices regu
late the proportion of exchange. In addition. It remains true that
total valuBFtotol price and total surplus-valuertotal profit, and
this proves that profits are the outcome of exploitation and that
the rate of profit is the same whether it is computed in value or
In price terms. This follows directly from expressions [10] and
[7J. From [10] we have
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p 1=p1x1=[Ci

(c1+vi>]x1=(i+a)(C j+V j)

(l= i,....n ).

{i i]

expression which gives the price measure of the total output of
sector 1 (1=1,....n). Hence, the price measure of the total output
of the economy is given by
S
ZPpU +alZtC j+V ^ H------ (C+V)=C+V+S=ZAj,
C+V ,

[121

and thus total prlcsf=total value. From expression [71 we have
S
SA1=oZ(C,+V1)=-------- (C+V)=S,
1
1 1 C+V

[13]

which shows that total profto=tatal surplus-value. Together the
last two expressions imply that (C+V)=(C+V)P, i.e., the total
investment is the same whether measured In value or in price
terms, and therefore,
S
^1
<7=------ =--------- ,
C+V (C+V)P

[14]

i.e., the rate of profit is the same in value and in price terms.
In this form Hllferdlng concludes that there is no contradltlon between the first and third volumes of Capital. Inasmuch
as they analyze different historical situations, they portray dif
ferent conditions of exchange. In his view, if BShm-Bawerk had
understood Marx's method he would not have had any difficulty
to discover the link between those two situations. As he did not,
the explanation that he fotnd for the deviation of prices from
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values in vo13, was to assume Marx's "withdrawal" from the
theory developed m voi.i. In this regard Hllferdlng (1904)
makes the following comment:
To speak of a withdrawal in this correction is tanta
mount to saying that Marx, in order to remain at a
definite point, first moved a mile forward and then
a mile backward. Such is, nevertheless, the view
which the vulgar economists have formed of the dia
lectic method, because they never see the process
but only the completed result, so that the method al
ways seams to them a mystical "hocus-pocus." (p.
155 for the English translation.)
The Transformation Prohlem
With Hllferding's reply to Bdhm-Bawerk, the controversy
between Marxists and neodasslcals seemed to have been re
solved in favor of the former. Nevertheless the thesis that the
price of production reflects the quantity of labor expended In the
production of the corresponding commodity had not been proved
at all. Hllferdlng might have scored ore or two points against
BOhm-Bawerk’s own theory —as Joan Robinson once put It, but
in no way did he show that prices are a transformation of valubs. Undoubtedly, Hllferding's argument relied on the presump

tion that expression [10] provides the correct formulation of
prices —for in that case it Is obvious that prices are a trans
formation of values. In truth, however, such a formulation of
prices is Incorrect, because It implies that Inputs are bought at
their values whereas outputs are sold at their prices —which is
impossible because In the market what is an output for the
seller is an input for the buyer. It Is rather surprising that nel-
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ther Hllferdlng nor Bflhm-Bawerk ever realized this fact, more
so since Marx himself was wall aware of the problem:
The foregoing statements have at any rate modified
the original assumption concerning tne determination
of of the co6t-prlce of commodities. We had origi
nally assumed that the cost-prlce of a commodity
equalled the value of the commodities consumed in
Its production. But for the buyer the price of produc
tion of a specific commodity is its cost-prlce, and
may thus pass as cost-prlce into the prices of other
commodities. Since the price of production may dif
fer from the value of a commodity, It follows that
the cost-prlce of a commodity containing this price
of production of another commodity may also stand
above or below that portion of its total value derived
from the value of the means of production consumed
by it. It Is necessary to remember this modified
significance of the cost-prlce, and to bear in mind
that there is always the possibility of an error If the
cost-prlce of a commodity in any particular sphere
is Identified with the value of the means of produc
tion consumed by it (Marx, 1967:3:164-65.)
In other words, Marx is saying that a correct formulation of
prices must count both inputs and outputs In the same units, i.e.
in price terms. Nevertheless, after making the above statement
Marx left the matter behind by simply saying that "our present
analysis does not necessitate a closer examination of this point"
(Marx, 1967:3:165.) Now this opinion convinced almost no one
because the problem was more serious than Marx thought. Once
prices are correctly defined, what reason is there to believe
that they are mere transformations of the corresponding values
and —more importantly— that profit is the reflection of surplus-value? Without clarifying this issue, one fundamental pur
pose of Capital* namely, to show that exchange categories (equa
lity, prices and profits) are but the phenomenal forms of pro-
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ductlon categories (exploitation, values and surplus-valie), is
called into question. As soon as von Bortklewltz (1907) pulled
the alarm, an important number of scholars began to wonder
whether the validity of the entire Marxian edifice depended on
the solution of this problem. Ever since, the Issue has been
known as the Transformation af Values into Prices of Produc
tioni and It was the merit of von Bortklewltz (1907b) to offer
the first consistent solution. (Many others ware provided after(5
words,
but they are simple reformulations of von Bortklewltz’s treatment of the problem.)
For simplicity, let us assume that there are only two sec
tors in the economy, namely: consumer goods (sector 1) and ca
pita! goods (sector 2.) For this economy we define
Pj ThB price cf production of commodity 1 (1=1, 2)
azj The capital goods Input per inlt of output of 1 (1=1, 2)
!j The direct labor-tlme input per unit of 1 (1=1, 2)
The real wage rate (per hour of direct labor)
v The rate of profit (in price terms.)
Prices of production may thus be formulated as follows:
Pi= (a2iPa+fc>iiPi) (i+ ir)'

{15.aU15.bJ,

p*= (as^fe+wJkp,) (1+x).
and letting p1=a1X1 (1=1, 2) we have
flfiXi= (SaidaAj+Ci)iiGfiAi) (l+ ff)

[16.a],[i6.b],
ofeAj= (aMcrj A*+o>JtzCTiXi) (1+it) t
that is.
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OTi—^aai(X2/Xi)Cfa+WliCr< ( i + f )

[17.a],[17.b].
Oa=^aa2+Cji2(X,/Xal a,J(l+ i)
This system has two equations and three unknowns (the two ar’s
and 7r.) Therefore one more equation must be added in order for
It to be solvable. When this Is done the system has a unique so
lution {oru or2t jt}, which proves that prices of production can in
deed be expressed as transformations of the corresponding val
ues. The only problem is to decide which equation, specifically,
is to be added in the model. In this regard, there are several al
ternatives, among them (12] or [13] —be* not both. This raises
a problem: If we choose [12], then, in general, [13] will not
hold.1® Alternatively, If we choose [13], It will be [12] which
does not hold. In any case, [14] is no longer true, i.e. the rate
of profit is not the same In value and in price terms. This is
easy to prove. Suppose that we choose [12], so that ZPj=ZAj
and Z A ^ S . Obviously ZPj=Z

(C+V) P+ZAj= (C+V) +S and

since Z A ^ S we have (C+V)P^C+V, and hence [14] Is not true.
Now suppose that we choose [13], so that ZAj=S and ZP^ZA^.
This also implies that [C+V)P^C+V, hence [14] doe6 not hold.
So Which Rata of Profit?
We now come to a last Issub: since the value and the price
rates of profit are not the same, the question may arise as to
which one we should use for the analysis of the LFTRP. Some
critics have suggested that since the economic agents operate In
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price terms, the price rate of profit should be the relevant one
(see Steedman, 1977:30.) Nevertheless this is hardly a reason
to dismiss the value rate of profit. For If one accepts the notion
of "essence" vs. "appearance" in capitalism, one must also admit
that it is the former, and not the latter, which is of import. In
any case, for our present purpose we will not have to make a
choice. This is so because although the value and the price rates
of profit do not coincide, they move tn the samo direction (see
Shaikh, 1982:75; and, In relation with the LFTRP, Roemer,
1981:97.) So far as we are concerned, we may use either the
value system or the [rice system. For It would not matter
where we found who£ If mechanization raises (lowers) one of
the two aforementioned rates of profit, it must also raise
(lower) the other. Therefore, the existing LFTRP arguments can
be analyzed, and new ones may be constructed, either in terms
of the value system or in terms of the price system. In what
follows, we will use this prerogative to our convenience.

Section Notes
*Thls analysis assumes that each Individual worker (pro
ducer) commercializes his or her own outputs, and that every
worker is capable of producing any commodity —this Implies
that the remuneration per hour of labor Is the same in all econ
omic activities.
^That tnder Simple Commodity Production price and value
must coincide may also be shown using Piero Sraffa's "algo
rithm of dated labor" (see Appendix I below.)
“i
"By labor-power or capacity for labour it is to be under
stood the aggregate of those mortal and physical capabilities
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existing m a human being* which he exBrclces whenever he produe66 [commodities] of any description' (Marx* 1967:1:171.)
^The term "means of subsistence" has a very ample mean
ing: it refers to the volume of the so-called "natural wants"
(food, clouthlng, housing, etc.), "which vary according to the cli
matic and other physical conditions" of each country, but basica
lly and above all, according to the "habits and degree of comfort
[In which the working class] has been formed...Nevertheless, in
a given country, and at a given period, the average quantity of
the means of sifcslstenoe necessary for the laborer is practi
cally known" (Marx, 1967:1:171.)
5
Marx does not deny the possibility of fraud in the ex
change of commodities, what he denies Is that profit can be ex
plained In that way. Why? Let us assume that some transactions
are not made according to equivalents. In that case, what is a
profit for one transactor is a loss for another, and profits and
losses cancel each other out. This Implies that in the aggreagate
there can be no surplus (net profit), which means that tne econ
omy can never grow. This is absurd.
®Morlshlma (1973:180-81) makes a rather curious criti
cism of this assumption. In his view, Marx assumes a uniform
rate of exploitation "because... different rates of exploitation
among different classes of workers [sic.] are not compatible
with Marx’s view of the polarization of society Into two clas
ses, capitalists and workers." However, whether workers are
exploited at the same or at different rates, the fact remains
that they are exploited, and so they belong to the same class,
namely, the class of the exploited (as opposed to the class at the
exploiters.) Marx was well aware that in reality there are many
different rates of exploitation, and his reasons to assume a uni
form rate bear no relation to Morlshlma's thinking:
Such a general rate of surplus-value has been as
sumed by us for the sake of theoretical simplifica
tion... In reality thane exists only approximation
(Marx, 1967:3:175.)
7
Actually, this denomination is not used by Marx. It Is due
to a Sorel (1897.)
a
This assumption will be removed later on (see Section IV
below.)
^Marx investigates this problem in Section 2, Chs. VIII,
IX, and X of the third volume of Capital
^T hls drive far mechanization is —as we will see later—
the basic component In Marx's theory of competition.
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^"The price of production Is (...) the centre around which
the dally market-prices fluctuate and tend to equalize one anoth
er within definite periods" (Marx, 1967:3:179.) Prices of pro
duction are ex-post average prices and they have nothing to do
with the so-called "long rtn equilibrium prices" of neoclassical
economics. Later on we will see what happens when the two
concepts are confused (see Section V below.) The notion of
prices of production as carters of gravity of market prices has
been examined by Semmler (1984.)
"S u c h capital as contain a larger percentage of constant
and a smaller percentage of variable capital than the average
social capital are called capitals of higher composition, ana,
conversely, those capitals in which the constant Is relatively
smaller, and the variable relatively greater than the average
social capital, are called capitals of lower composition. Finally
we call those capitals whose composition coincides with the
average, capitals of average composition (...)
The valuB of the commodities produced by capitals [of
higher composition] would (...) be samaller than their price of
production, the price of production of the commodities [produced
with capitals or lower composition] smaller than their value,
and only in the case of oapltal (...) in branches of production In
which the composition happens to coincide with the social aver
age, would value and price of production be equal" (Marx, 1967:
3:163-64.)
13

"Apart from the domination of prices and price move
ments by the law of value, it is quite appropriate to regard the
values or commodities as not only theoretically but also Histori
cally prtus to the prices of production " (Marx, 1967:3:177.
Emphasis In original.)
"The exchange of commodities at their values, or approxi
mately at their values, thus requires a much lower stage than
their exchange at their prices pf production, which requires a
definite level of capitalist development" (Marx, 1967:3:177.)
14

Paul Samuelson —who is far from susplctlon of being a
Marxist— tells the following anecdote:
"Some twenty years ago at a conference at American Uni
versity, 1 touched a filial nerve In John Maurice d ark when 1
cast some doubts about his father’s belief that he, John Bates
Clark, had irrefutably proved in the last decade of the last cen
tury the ethical justness of the marginal productivity mode of
distribution. In his reply J.M. Clark said that his father had been
deeply conclous of the challenge offered by Marx's notion of ex
ploitation ("under whose theory any share capital gets is outrigh robbery") and felt under a necessity to defend the competi
tive system from those charges, which if true would have ad
mittedly constituted a grave indictment" (Samuelson, 1971:
423.)
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^Landmarks in the discussion are Bortklewltz (1907b),
Wlntemltz (1948), Seton (1957), Samuelson (1971), Morlshlma (1973), Lalbman (1974), Steadman (1977) and Shaikh
(1982.)
^Bortklewltz (1907b) provides a numerical example. (See
also Vegara, 1979, pp. 133-135.)

§ II. ARGUMENTATION OF THE LFTRP BY MARX
Marx develops the LFTRP in terms of the value system (Marx,
1967:3:Part III.) For this reason, in order to facilitate the pre
sentation of his argument we will use the value model associ
ated with the two-sector economy described In the previous sec
tion. The model is the following:
X j—3 ijX 2 " H J liX t+ li (1 ”W X i)

Xj-aaXj+wljXi+ljli-wXi) _
where a^ X * ^ ,

[l.a],[i.b]

and 1j (1-<oX1)=s1 (1=1,2). Let Xj be the

total output of sector i (1=1,2) per period of production (e.g.,
per year.) We have:
C=2c1x1=Zaa1XaX1=X2(aaiX,+a2aXz)=Xa6

[2]

V=Zv1x1=2wi1X,x1=wXi (liXt+l2Xa)=wXiL [3]
S=Zs1x1=Zl1(l-wXl)x1=(l-wX,)L,

[41

where 6=ai,x,+aIJx2 is the physical amount of capital goods in
put used up in the economy during one period of production, and
L=iiXt+i2X* is the amount of direct labor input. If there are N
workers involved in production and each works for t hours per
period (i.e., the length of the “working period" is t hours), then
expressions [3] and (4] can be written In the form
V=^X,Nt

[5]

S=(i-aA1)Nt

[61

It follows from the above definitions that
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where r=© /N is an index of the degree in which capital input
(in physical terms) and labor input (as measured by the number
workers) are used in production. Marx calls this index the tech
nical composition of capital.
(c)

S
(l-a>Xi)L
e
<7=------- =------------- =-----C+V Xj0+wXiL Q+i

[9]

With these definitions at hand* the development of the
LFTRP by Marx can be easily traced. Marx begins with the idea
that the urge for profit forces capitalists to undergo a fierce
competition against each other. From the point of view of each
Individual capitalist* the competitive struggle Is aimed at
driving his rivals from the field and capturing their share of the
market. With this purpose in mind many different weapons are
used in the battle. Including advertising and even sabotage. Ulti
mately. however, the only method by which one capitalist can
sectre (a) that he will drive some of his rivals from the field;
and (b)» that others will not do the same to him. is to sell at a
lower price than his competitors. Now,
In order to be able to sell more cheaply without ruin
ing himself, he must produce more cneaply, that is,
raise the productivity of labor as much as possible
(Marx, 1977:9:222.)
Once again, many methods can be devised for this purpose.

For Instance, the capitalist could try to be a paternalistic em
ployer. If this strategy should fall, he could try its opposite.
(e.g., he could lay off some employees to set the example.)*
Nevertheless, the ability of such methods to raise labor produc
tivity has definite lim its, and once those limits are reached,
lower production costs can only be achieved by means of mecha
nization. As Marx (1977:9:222) puts it,
the productive power of labor Is raised, above all,
by a universal and continual improvement of machin
ery (Marx's emphasis.)
For the capitalist who moves first to adopt a new technol
ogy It becomes possible, owing to his lower cost of production,
to undersell his rivals and win additional share of the market at
their expense. Marx (1977:9:223) puts it as follows:
If now, by the utilization of new machines and their
improvement, one capitalist has found the means of
producing [more cheaply] than his competitors (...),
now will this capitalist operate? He could continue
to sell at the old (...) price; this would, however, be
no means of driving his opponents from the field and
enlarging his own sales (...); consequently, our capi
talist will sell his [product] more cheaply than his
competitors. [In this way] he attains the object he
wlsna6 to attain (...) He drives his rivals from the
field, he wrests from them at least a part of their
sales, by underselling them (Marx's emphasis.)
Faced with this reality, the rival capitalists have no choice
but to adopt the same technology, and this puts everyone in the
position of having to start the same process all over. As Marx
(1977:9:223-24) expresses It,
the privileged position of [the Innovative] capitalist
is not of long duration; other competing capitalists
introduce the same machines, introduce them on the
same or on a larger seals (...) The capitalists find
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themselves, therefore, in the same position relative
to one another as before the introduction of the new
means of production (...) [And] on the basis of the
new cost of production the same game begins again
(...) more machinery (...) (Marx’s emphasis.)
In Marx’s view, this process raises the technical composition
of capital, so we have
PROPOSITION 1. Mechanization raises P.
Furthermore, the Increase in the technical composition of capi
tal is mtrrared by an increase in the organic composition. I.e.
PROPOSITION 2. Mechanization, by way of Increas
ing P, also Increases Q,
Finally, according to Marx the Increase In the organic composi
tion of capital results in a lower average rate of profit, i.e.
PROPOSITION 3. The increase in Q lowers a.
The Counteracting Influences
Marx completes the development of the LFTRP with the ci
tation of a series of counteracting elemets to the fall in the rate
of profit. He lists six of them (see Marx, 1967:3:232-40), na
mely: (1) Increasing intensity of exploitation, (2) depression of
wages below the value of labar-power, (3) relative overpopula
tion, (4) foreign trade, (5) cheapening of the elements of con
stant capital, and (6) the increase of stock capital. Of these, the
last one refers to the way in which the average rate of profit is
computed, and it is not clear at all why it should be a counter2
acting farce to the fall In the rate of profit. The same applies
to the "depression of wages below the value of labor-power."
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Marx (1967:3:235) says that "it Is ana of the most important
factors checking the tendency of the rate of profit to fall"; but it
Is hard to see why. In reality the wage carrot fall below the
value of lobar-power because (by the definition of labor-power)
It would be insufficient to buy the "means of subsistence neces
sary for the maintenance of the labourer." What can be a coun
teracting force to the fall in the rate of profit is the decrease in
the value at the real wage which goes pari passu with mechani
zation. Since Xj Is the total labor-tlme (direct and indirect) ne
cessary to produce one unit of commodity 1 (1=1,2), its Inverse
1/Aj is the amourt of that commodity which can be produced
with one unit of labor-tlme (direct and indirect.) Mechanization
raises that amount, therefore It lowers Xj and the value of the
real wage uAj. Since the organic composition of capital varies
inversely with uAi (see expression (81 above), it follows that
the rise in the technical composition brought about by mechanltlon is not translated in the same proportion into an increase In
Q (expression [8] above). This way (through preventing the or
ganic composition from rising as much as it would otherwise)
the decrease in the value of the real wage checks the fall in the
rate of profit (see expression [9] above.)
The cheapening at elements of constant capital is closely
related to what has Just been said. Total constant capital is C=
A*0 (see expression [2].). Mechanization raises 0 and this tends
to increase C. But mechanization also lowers X2 and this pre
vents C from rising at the same rate as 0 . To be sure, "In iso-
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ated cases the mass of the elements of constant capital [9] may
even increase, while its value [C] remains the same or falls "
(Marx, 1967:3: 236.) In other words, due to the decrease in X2
the total constant capital does not increase as much as It would
otherwise. There follows a check to the fall in the rate of prof
it: since <r=S/(C+V), the lower the Increase in C the lower the
fall in a.
hrcroQstng the intensity of exploitation contemplates the
possibility that capitalists attempt to hinder the fall in the rate
of profit by means of ad hoc measures such as lengthening the
working-period and intensifying labor (see Marx, 1967:3:232:
33.) There seems to be a great deal of confusion as to how the
first of these two measures operates. Sweazy (1942:98) as
serts that "Lengthening the working [period] directly raises the
rate of surplus value by increasing the amount of surplus labor
without affecting the amount of necessary labor." But this seems
to be Incorrect. It is true that a rise in t increases S (see ex
pression [6] above) without affecting X y However, It is not
true that as a result of It the rate of exploitation must increase.
This Is so because (as expression [7] indicates) e is independent
of the length of the working period. (Which is logical because an
increase in t not only raises S but also V —see expression [5]
above— so that the rate of exploitation may well remain un
changed.) Lengthening the working period counteracts the fall In
the rate of profit, not by raising the rate of exploitation, but by
slowing down the increase in the organic composition. This fol
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lows from the fact that as t rises so does V but not C. (The
same result can be seen through expression [8] above: mechanltlon raises F and this tends to increase Q; but if at the same
time t is raised, Q. will not increase at the same rate as T.)
Matters are more clear as to the explanation of how inten
sifying labor prevents the rate of profit from falling. Speed-up
and stretch-out raise the productivity of labor in the sense that
they result in more output in the same time, thereby reducing
the "necessary labor time," Xj (1=1,2.) This way they raise the
amount of surplus value (see expression [4] above) and lower
the value of the total Investment (C+V=Ai0+uA,L). It follows
that the rate of profit tends to Increase on account of both a
higher numerator and a smaller denominator. Sweezy (1942:
98) expresses this counteracting effect in a different way:
Speed-up and stretch-out (...) raise the rate of sur
plus value through compressing necessary labor into
a shorter time and hence leaving a larger proportion
of an unchanged working [period] for surplus labor.
In summary, while lengthening the working period tampers
the fall In the rate of profit by slowing down the increase in the
organic composition, intensifying labor produces the same re
sult by Increasing the rate of surplus value.
Foreign trade helps to offset the fall In the rate of profit
by allowing the use of imported inputs whose value Is below
what it would be if those Inputs were produced at home. "Since
foreign trade partly cheapens the elements of constant capital,
and partly the necessities of life for which the variable capital
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is exchanged, it tends to raise the rate of profit by increasing
the rate of surplus-value and lowering the value of constant caplpltal" (Marx, 1967:3:237.)
Relative overpopulation. The explanation of how this factor
contributes to impede the fall in the rate of profit is rather con
fusing. Marx (1967:3:236) begins by pointing out that In the
process of mechanization some degree of overpopulation (in
other words unemployment) is created. He then stresses that on
the basis of these unemployed workers,
new lines of production are opened ip, especially for
the production of luxuries, and It is these that take
as their basis this relative over-population (Marx,
1967:3:237.)
It follows that in these new lines of production "the variable
capital makes ip a considerable portion of the total capital (...),
so that the mass of surplus-value" that they generate is "inusually high" (Marx, 1967:3:237.) At this point he appears to
assume that for that reason such industries will enjoy rates of
profit above those of the old (more mechanized) branches of
production, and "since the general rate of profit is formed by
levelling the rates of profit of the individual branches of produc
tion," (Marx, 1967:3:237), the creation of the new (less mech
anized) industries tends to increase the general rate of profit.
Sweezy (1942:99) buys this argument at face value:
the existence of unemployed laborers Is conductive
to the setting up of new industries with a relatively
low organic composition of capital and hence a rela
tively nigh rate of profit. When these relatively high
rates of profit are averaged in with the rates of
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profit obtaining In the old industries, they raise the
overall rate or profit.
However, there are a few problems with Marx's argument.
In the first place, it is not dear why the new industries should
be less capital-intensive than the ones in operation. Secondly,
even if they were, It would be Irrelevant to the issue at hand
because —as It can be shown (see Bortklewltz, 1907b)—luxury
Industries do not participate In the formation at the general rote
of profit. Lastly, we have seen In the previous section that one
characteristic of the transformation of values into prices of
production is that the individual capitalists do not retain the
surplus-value (nor, therefore, the profit) generated in their own
industries. In the formation of the average rate of profit, sur
plus-value is redistributed from Industries with low organic
composition to industries with high organic composition, so that
It is not evident that the former necessarily enjoy higher profit
rates than the latter. It Is more appropriate to say that the cre
ation of labor-intensive industries —if it does happen at all—
counteracts the fall In the rate of profit by preventing the or
ganic composition from rising as much as it would otherwise.
What Marx 'really* meant
With so many ccxntaraceiqg forces at work, one wonders
what exactly Marx means by the LFTRP. The questions are, (1)
Does the rate of profit actually fall? And (2) if so. Is its fall
continuous or only a long run trend? There is a great deal of
confusion anxnd these issues and Marx is partly responsible
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for It. On the one hand the very use of the word tendency is
misleading ^ On the other, consider the following statements:
[Mechanization] produces (...) a contlnuosly rising
organic composition of the total capital. The Imme
diate effect of this (...) is represented by a c a tv n t
ally falling general rate of profit (Marx, 1967:3:
213. Emphasis added.)
So It appears that the rate of profit falls all the time Yet Marx
(1967:3:213) points out Immediately that
this fall does not manifest itself in an absolute form,
but rather as a tendency toward a progressive fall
This happens because of the counteracting factors,
which cross and amul the effect of the general law,
and which give it merely the characteristic of a ten
dency, for which reason we have referred to the fall
of the general rate of profit as a tendency to fall
(Marx, 1963:232.)
And finally, he declares that
We have thus seen in a general way that the same
influences which produce a tendency in the general
rate of profit to fall, also call forth counter-effects
which hamper, retard and partly paralyze this fall.
The latter do not do away with tne law, but Impair
Its effect. Otherwise, It would not be the fall or the
general rate of profit, but rather Its relative slow
ness, that would oe incomprehensible. Thus, the law
acts only as a tendency. And It is only (...) after
long periods that its effects become strikingly pro
nounced (Marx, 1967:3:239. Emphasis addea.)
Only aie reasonable conclusion can be derived from this.
Ronald Meek (1967:134-35) expresses it as follows:
Marx can...be justly criticized for a certain lack of
rigour... In some contexts he speaks of the falling
tendency of the rate of profit in terms which sug
gest that he believed that it would tend to fall more
or less continuously... In actual fact, however, all
that his argument as it stands allows us to say is
that... there will eventually come a point beyond
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which no conceivable [comtertendency] could possi
bly prevent... [the rate of profit] from falling below
Its original level... It is also d ear that In the In
tervening period... the rate of profit may well rise
above Its original level (Original emphasis.)
This is how many Marxists interprets the word tendency in
the context of the LFTRP, i.e.: that due to the continual mecha
nization of production the rate of profit exhibits a downward
trend. But many other Marxists have a different understanding
of the problem. In a recent book which is widely used for peda
gogical purposes throughout British and American (Diversities,
Fine and Harris (1979:64-65) put forth this Interpretation of
the LFTRP:
A second meaning Is that if one abstracts from the
counteracting influences one identifies an 'underly
ing* direction of movement of the rate of profit. This
Interprets a tendency as a proposition developed at a
certain level of abstraction which by Itself yields no
general predictions about movements in the rate of
profit.
This claim is partly correct. Tendencies do not necessarily
have to materialized in facts. Whether this is the meaning that
Marx attaches to the word tendency in the context of the LFTRP
Is quite a different problem, and we have seen some evidence
that he thinks of an actual fall* though presumaby for the long
run. In any case some compromising stand must be taken on this
point. In this regard we will assume that what Marx means is
what he says, namely, that (sooner or later) the continual me
chanization of production does result in a lower average rate of
profit.
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Soctlon Notes
In a recent paper, Hurd (1986) provides an excellent re
view of these two approaches to the labor process —seduction
vs. control. He writes:
The management of work has been influenced by two
competing philosophies. Scientific Management and
Human Relations (...) The basic message of the pro
ponents of Human Relations is that If management
treats workers more humanely, then workers will
respond positively and their productivity will Im
prove. Tnls philosophy can be traced to the paternal
ism of many nineteenth century capitalists (...)
By contrast,
Scientific Management adherents have argued that
the best way to Improve productivity is to (..) design
efficient production systems and enforce production
standards. The essence of Scientific Management Is
the dictatorial control of the labor process by mangement.
^"The foregoing five points [(i) to (5) above] may still be
supplemented by the following, which, however, cannot be more
fully treated for the present. With the progress of capitalist
production, which goes hand in hand with accelerated accumula
tion, a portion or capital is calculated and applied only as
Interest-bearing capital (...) This has no boartpg on the level of
the general rate of profit, because fix the latter proflt=lnterest
+proflt of all klnds+ground rent, the division into these parti
cular categories being immaterial to It (...)" (Marx, 1967:3:
240. Emphasis added) But if the interest-bearing capital has
nothing to do with the level of the general rate of profit (and we
will see In Section V below that mis is true), how can this be
affected by it In any way whatsoever?
o
It may well be that this Is what Marx tries to say. But
his presentation of the issue (see Marx, 1967:3:233) is so con
fusing that the reader can hardly know for sure.
A
The issue of tendency lows is an aspect of classical econ
omics whose Interpretation appears vary unclear. Marx was not
the only classical economist to develop arguments In terms of
tendency laws. Malthus and Ricardo before nlm, and after him,
John Stuart Mill, all did the same. But they all forgot to explain
unarm blguously what they were doing. Some interesting com
ments are provided by Sowell (1974:112-148), Blaug (1980a:
Chap. 3), aid Blaug (1980b: Chap. 2.) The issue, however, is
far rrom resolved

§ EL EVALUATION OF THE LFTRP:
(i) THE VALUE SYSTEM
PROPOSITION 1 in Marx's argument implicitly assumes that
presupposing the existence of an index of the mass of means of
production and an index of the mass of labar-power, we can ex
pect the former to rise faster (or to drop slower) than the lat
ter as technical progress takes place. In other words, the propo
sition assumes that over the long-period technical progress is
capital using-labor saving. What reasons did Marx have to make
this assumption? In the previous section we pointed out that he
conceived of technical progress as a means for capitalists to
fight the war of competition. Since competition is fought, above
all, by the cheapening of the commodities —or, what amounts
to the same thing, by lowering the unit cost of production, Marx
supposes that technical progress follows a definite pattern,
namely, only those techniques which do not increase production
costs per unit of output are adopted. Nevertheless this is no
reason to assume that such techniques have to be more capital
intensive than the ones already in operation —nothing in theory
prevents them from being more labor intensive. Marx also con
ceived of technical progress as a weapon to ensure capitalist
control over the labor force:
The self-acting mule, the greatest Invention of mo
dem Industry, put out of action thesplm ers who
were in revolt (Marx, 1976:6:207.)
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Nonetheless it would be far-fetched to propose that this latter

motive is the driving force of technical progress —and indeed
Marx himself minimizes its overall Importance.
Now despite the fact that it is not self-evident, the assump
tion of a capltal-uslng bias in technical progress has always
been popular among economists. Even some of the otherwise
severe critics of Marx (including Taussig, J.B. Clark and BGhmBawerk, to quote only a few) made use of It in their writings.
Some contemporary w riters, however, have been less willing to
accept it without question, among them Robinson (1937) and
Blaug (1960 and 1985.) In their opinion, there Is no reason to
expect technical progress to be biased ' ‘one way or the other."
Their explanation is simple. On the one hand, technical progress
cheapens the means of production and this will induce capital
ists to substitute capital for labor. On the other hand, it also
cheapens the means of subsistence —thereby reducing the cost
of labor, and this will induce capitalists to substitute labor for
capital. Hence, one type of bias should be compensated by the
other. This argument has some theoretical merit, but only if the
word should is replaced by could i.e. one type of bias could be
compensated by the other. Whether or not It actually does is an
entirely different question, which recent empirical evidence an
swers in a negative way. For example. In her Input-output anal
ysis of the structural change in the American economy over the
period from 1939 to 1961, Artie Carter (1970:150 and 218)
concludes that "direct labor saving is the most striking feature
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of structural change. Labor coefficients decrease over time in
virtually all sectors and fall relative to other input coeffi
cients." Similar results are reported by INSEE —the govern
ment bureau of statistics— for the French economy over the
period from 1959 to 1972 (see INSEE. 1974.)
PROPOSITION 2 is far more polemic because it is unclear
why the organic composition should vary directly with the tech
nical composition of capital. Marx probably had some intuitive
reasons to assume that it would happen, but his theory as It
stands does guarantee that result. Given the real wage and the
length of the working period, expression [8] In the previous sec
tion. le..
[1]
shows that Q. depends bath on T and on the ratio X^Xt. Automa
tion raises T and hence It tends to raise £2. Now. automation
also lowers the unit value of the commodities. How their ratio
Xz/Xt will change is indeterminate; but if it decreases. £2 will
also tend to fall. Thus, the final change In £2 will depend on how
strong these two effects are. Theoretically, £2 may Increase, de
crease or remain unchanged. This Indetermination can be re
solved In favor of Mane only if it is assumed that the ratio
Xz/Xi either increases or remains constant. However, this as
sumption Is unwarranted because It rules out the possibility that
automation lowers the unit value of consumer goods faster than
the unit value of capital goods —a possibility which cannot be
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excluded a priori. That is, however, the procedure followed by
Shaikh (1978b:250), who simply assumes that As/A, remains
constant:
In deducing the general law Marx abstracts from any
long-term differential movements in the unit value of
the two departments —precisely because all capitals
are subject to the necessity of technical progress.
However, while it Is clear that "all capitals are subject to the
necessity of technical progress," It is not so clear that tech
nical progress should increase productivity at the same rate in
every sector of the economy —which is what Shaikh’s assump
tion implies. He does not solve the problem posed above but
simply ignores it —which is unacceptable.
Fine and Harris (F&H, 1979:59} and John Weeks (1981:
198) also try to validate Marx's second proposition. They claim
that the criticism under consideration Is based on a confusion:
in their view, none of the critics have really understood what
Marx means by organic composition. They base this claim In the
following quotation from Marx (1967:1:612):
I call the former the value composition, the latter
the organic composition. Between the two there is a
strict correlation. To express this, I call the value
composition. In so far as it is determined by Its
technical composition and mirrors the changes in
the latter, the organic composition of capital.
This paragraph is itself rather confusing. Marx seems to
distinguish the organic composition from the value composition,
but the nature of their distinction is unclear. Thus F&H and John
Weeks offer the following interpretation. Production is not ins
tantaneous but rather takes time. Consider, for instance, the

61

Paco of our two-sector modal economy: at the beginning of a pe
riod of production, the capitalists buy capital goods and laborpower which are then used to produce consumer goods (sector 1)
and more capital goods (sector 2.) By the end of the period, the
outputs are ready to be sold according to some values. These, in
general, differ from those at which the inputs were bought be
cause they are the result of a different process of production.
Now let us assume that at the beginning of period i mechan
ization is undertaken in both sectors of the economy, thereby
giving rise to a new technical composition of capital, H i). On
the basis of this new composition, production takes place over
the period and by the end of It some values A,(i) and Aa(l) are
formed. The question is, should H i) be valorized at these val
ues or at those which prevailed at the beginning of the period ?
Reasonably, H i) should be valorized according to the latter,
\i(0) and Aj(0). Based on this, F&H and John Weeks conclude
that the value composition is the technical composition valor
ized by thB new values whereas the organic composition is the
technical composition valorized by the old ones. This is a sound
Interpretation of Marx's quoted paragraph, but the conclusion
which F&H and John Weeks derive from It doe6 not seem so.
They say,
Technical change necessarily involves a rise in the
organic composition [because the latter] Is the tech
nical composition valorized by the old values (John
Weeks, 1981:199; sim ilar paragraph in F&H, 1979:
59.)
This conclusion does not follow from its premises. When the In
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puts used up in period 1 are valorized by the values farmed In
period 0, the organic composition is given by
( Xa(0) \ f 1 \
Q<

H

w

j y

n i)-

and for the next period,
r Xa(l> > f 1 n

We know that (1) H 2) >ni) because automation raises T; (11) o>
and t are constant by assumption; and (ill), X,(1)<X,(0) and
At(i)<As(0) because automation lowers the w it value of the
commodities. From (ill) we only can Infer that (X jdl/X id)) *
CXz(0) /Xi(0)]. Now we can see that, on the one hand, automa
tion tends to make 0(2)>0(1) because of (1) and (11), but on the
other hand It tends to make Q (2) <0(1) when (A *(i)/A ,(i))<
CA,(0)/A,(0)). in which case we cannot know If 0(2) ^O (l) in
the overall. This indetermlnatlon can be resolved in favor of the
argument put forth by F&H and John Weeks, only if we assume
that (A .(i)A 1(i))*(A.(D)A.K»). which cannot be done because
It contradicts (ill.) We are thus in the same situation as before.
The error of F&H and John Weeks is that they want to valorize
the inputs used q> in the current period by the values farmed in
the previous erne, but they do not want to apply the same rule to
inputs used up in the next period. Hence, we may conclude our
discussion of Marx's PROPOSITION 2 saying that it is inwar
ranted.
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Nevertheless, let us assume that automation indeed raises
the organic composition of capital, so that we may proceed to
discuss PROPOSITION 3. The problem here is that even within
Marx’s own logical argument, there is no basis to state that in
creases in the organic composition will sooner or later lower
the rate of profit. The reason, as pointed out earlier, is that au
tomation increases not only the organic composition (assuming
it actually doee so) but also the rate of surplus-value. Now, ex
pression [9] in the previous section, i.e.
S

(i-a>A,)L
=

C+V

€
[21

=

A^e+wA.L

Q+i

tells us that unless the increase in the organic composition is
shown to overcome the increase in the rate of surplus-value we
cannot say that the rate of profit will fall. Nor is there any
point in saying that It exhibits a tendondcy to fall. As long as
the lndetermlnatlon remains, It would be equally correct to say
that the rate of profit exhibits a tendency to rise.
Many arguments have been tried In order to solve this pro
blem. One of them goes that whereas the organic composition
con rise without limit, the rate at surphts-vahio cannot (Mandel,
1962:1:212-13; Mattlck, 1969:62; Bullock and Yaffe, 1975:
20.) This argument Is fallacious. Mechanization persistently
lowers Xt, and we know by expression [7] in the previous sec
tion that the rate of surplus-value will rise as long as X, drops:
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i-o>X,
llm e= llm ----------►»
Xi"*0

Xt-*0

(*>Xi

Hence the idea that the rate of surplus-value has an upper Itm tt
must be founded on a mathematical error, and so it is: instead
of €=(l-&>Xt)/a>Xu the proponents of the upper Itm tt argument
use the following alternative expression of the rate of surplusvalue (notice that the formula is actually the same, only that it
Is not simplified one step further):
S

L-wXjL

*=---- =--------------------V
(*>X,L
Now the argument gpes that since total surplus-value S=L-<*>XiL
cannot be greater than the total living labor L, the numerator of
[3] has a theoretical maximum equal to L. Hence, the argument
ends. If the numerator has a maximum so m ist have the entire
ratio. This is false. Total surplus-value is L only when &>XtL=0,
and In this case €=o». In other words, the mass of surplus-value
approaches its theoretical maximum as total variable capital
approaches zero, and as this happens the rate of surplus-value
approaches infinity. The argument of an ipper limit of the rate
of surplus-value is mathematically faulty and economically un
sound —what does it mean that total variable capital is zero?
More to the point, if the validity of the LFTRP depended on the
alleged existence of an upper limit of the rate of exploitation
one would have to conclude that —since variable capital has

[3]
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never been zero— the LFTRP never in history has been at work.
This surely is not what Marx had in mind.
Anwar Shaikh (1978a:223 and 1978b:239-40) has tried a
different route which, althought more promising for empirical
purposes, ends up at a sim ilar theoretical point. Shaikh's argu merit entails the switching of the discussion from an upper
lim it of the rate of surplus-value to an upper Itm tt at the rote
at profit It is developed along the following lines. Given that
the mass of surplus-value is the difference between the amount
of living labor (LI and total variable capital (V), the actual rote
at profit may be expressed in the form o=(LV)/(C+V). Shaikh
then defines the maximum rote of profit as that which would be
obtained If V were squeezed to zero —as Marx puts It, if wor
kers could live an air, i.e., a^j= L/C. He concludes (Shaikh,
1978a:233):
Now, if a rising technical composition does indeed
reflect Itself as a rising ratio C/L —hence a falling
ratio L/C— then the actual rate of profit will be
progressively squeezed between a descending celling
and an unyielding floor, so that it must Itself exhibit
a downward tendency.
And also (Shaikh, 1978b:240):
The proposition that mechanization (...) lowers the
maximum rate of profit would appear to imply that
sooner or later the actual rate of profit must neces
sarily fall. (Enphasls In original.)
This argument seems to be correct at first glance, but a closer
scrutiny shows that it is not. For let us accept that automation
does lower the maximum rate of profit. It does not follow from
this that the actual rate at prafu must also decrease. That

66

would require not only that
Otherwise

fell, but also that it converged

may decrease without ever forcing a to fall:

they might Just approach each other asymptotically (see Figures
3.1 and 3.2 below.) Hence, what is necessary to validate the ar
gument put forth by Shaikh is a proof that

converges either

toward zero or to a level below the original level of a. Such a
proof is yet to be provided.
Marx's Argument as An Empirical Problem
Proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of
production, it is thereby proved o logical necessity.,
a falling rate of profit (Marx, 1967:3:213. Empto
sis added.)
This is Incorrect. As indicated above, Marx does not prove
that from the necessity of mechanization a falling rate of profit
necessarily follows. His argument yields a theoretical lndetarmlnatlon rather than a definite conclusion. This does not mean,
however, that In reality the LFTRP is not at work. The theore
tical mdetermlnatlon can go either way, for the affirmative or
for the negative. What this means is that Marx provides an ex
planation for a falling rate of profit which —within the value
system— can neither be ‘proved’ nor 'disproved* theoretically.
Hence we may want to turn to empirical evidence for guidance.
Unfortunately, the empirical research In this area is faced
with serloiB difficulties owing to the absence of statistical se
ries for the labor value categories on which Marx's argument is
based. Nevertheless something close to a test of the law has
been devised. This attempt, however, is only Indicative because
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Figure 3.1
The actual rate at profit (a) will fall if the maximum
rate at profit
also falls and converges towards a
a level wlch Is below the original level of o.

Leeenb (1) level o f convergence of
12) original level of o

Figure 3.2
If
does not converge toward a level below the ori
ginal level of o, a falling
m l& t never force o to
fall: they could approach each other asymptotically.

time
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It does not really test the LFTRP but rather addresses the prop
osition of a rising C/L ratio — a falling

Hence In no way

would it be possible to reject the LFTRP on the basis of such
a test. Nonetheless* If its results ran against the thesis of a
rising C/L ratio* this would Indeed throw dark clouds over the
Marxian law. The test is as follows (see Shaikh* 1978a:232):
Since C is the labor-value of the means of production, and L is
the value added by living labor, their money equivalents are K,
the money value of the means of production, and Y, the money
value added or net notional product. Hence C/L may be approxi
mated by K/Y, the capltal-oaLput ratio. Therefore, a rising K/Y
wolud mean a falling maximum rate of profit. Otherwise, one
must conclude that <J^ does not fall over tim e.
Regretably, the available estimations of the capital-output
ratio provide conflicting results. Klein and Kosobud (1961) have
found "a significant downward trend" for this ratio; S. Kuznets
(1961) found it to be rather stable; Perlo (1966) and Shaikh
(1984) claim an empirical rising trens; and finally, GUlman
(1957) offers results which, depending on who interprets than,
provide evidence contrary to Marx's law (Blaug, 1960} or fa
vorable to it (Castells, 1980.) This confusing situation should
not come as a surprlce: experience frequently shows that what
economic theory oaimot prove econometrics cannot demonstrate
either.

* IV. EVALUATION OF THE LFTRP:
(2) THE PRICE SYSTEM
Having to face theoretical lndeterminatlons is rather uncomfort
able. This is why economists of all persuasions have tried to
resolve the controversy over the LFTRP. The Oklshlo theorem
(Oklshlo, 1961) has been regarded by many, both Marxists and
non-Marxists alike, as the ultimate solution of the problem. We
now turn to this theorem. Consider the price system associated
with our two-sector economy (see section I above) —and recall
that so far we abstract from the existence of fixed capital (as
Oklshlo does.) We have.
pj=(a«Pi+o>iiPi)(l+Jr)’

p^feaaPa+wLpiMi+Tr).

li.aj[i.b ]

For our present purpose It Is not necessary to know the absolute
prices. Hence the consumer goods may be used as the numeraire
(pt=l) and we have:
i=(a*iPa+a>li)(i+ff)'

I2.a][2.b]

Pr=(M>a+«!2)(i+ir),
The solution {pa, x} of this sytem provides the average rate of
profit and the relative price of capital goods under the ruling
technique { a3j, a»» i» L }. In order to find that solution, let us
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write equations [2.a] and [2.b] In the form
i-(aa,p2+wli)
ir=-

a^iPz+wi,
[3.a][3.b]

tt=-

Pa'faaaP^+wlj)
aziPa+wlz

In Appendix II it is shown that: (1) Equation [3.a] intersects the
Pz-axls at (i-uitl/azt and the jr-axls at (i-uii)A>ii. (2) Equa
tion [3.b] intersects the p2-axls at cjij/(l-an) and the x-axls at
-1. (3) Equation [3.a] is monotonlcally decreasing and equation
[3.b] is monotonlcally increasing. In addition, far the system to
be viable in the sense that it yields a positive rate of profit. It
must be the case that ((l-w ii)/a 2 i)>Cui2/(l-a» )). Therefore, one
can derive the solution depicted in Figure 4.1. Hence under the
ruling technique the average rate of profit Is jt® and the relative
price of capital goods is ps°.

Figure 4.1
Determtnatlan of the Average Rate of Profit
(Circulating capital case1
4.
IT
C3b)

1-wJi
«1|
*°
/
-1

a lj

l-a„

*
Pa

Pj #

a"
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Suppose now that a new technique { a*, i*} which reduces the
unit cost of production at ruling prices is introduced in sector 1
(1= 1 or 2, or 1=1 end 2.) If the innovation occurs in sector 1
we have:
a2i*pi°

(. a21pi0+ cjij.

Multiplying by
(az^ + w ij* ) (1+jt0) < (a*,p2°+ wi,) (l+u°)=l,
and from here,

H a„V + w i,*)
< -------------------- =JT* far pj=Pa“.
aai*P2°+<»>il*
This expression indicates that in the new price equation of sec
tor 1 the rate of profit at the ruling prices (I.e. the transitional
rate of profit In sector 1) must be greater than the ruling rate
of profit. In terms of Figure 4.1 this means that the curve re
presenting the new price equation of sector 1 lies to the right
of the old curve. Therefore the new avenge rate of profit (tt*)
must be greater than the old one hr0). (See Figure 4.2.)
If the Innovation occurs in sector 2 we have
+ Cjij* <ajaP*°+uij.
Multiplying by (1+0°),
(an *pa#+ wV) (1+ irt < (aap*°+a>ia) (1+0°) =pa°.
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and thus.
P20-fea*p2°+wJa)
TT°<--------------------=V* for P2=p2°.

In terms of Figure 4.1 this Implies that the curve representing
the new price equation of sector 2 lies to the left of the old
curve. Hence the new average rate at profit (tt*) m ist be greater
than the old one fir0). (See Figure 4.3.)
It follows from above that if the Innovation occurs in both
sectors simultaneously (1=1 and 2) the same result applies* i.e.
the new average rate of profit must be greater than the old one,
this case being a mere combination of the preceding two. This
is the Oklshlo theorem.

Flgtre 4.2.
Effect of sector l*s mechanization upon the average rate
of profit. (Circulating capital case.)
IT
V
IT*

v°

Nate: (----- ) represents the new price equation of sector I
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Figure 4.3.
Effect of sector 2 's mechanization upon the average rate
of profit (Circulating capital case.)
IT

Note: (— ) represents the new price equation of sector 2

Fixed Capital and the Oklshlo Theorem
There is no doubt that the Oklshlo theorem seems to be a
major finding, for It suggests that the lndetermlnatlon regard
ing the effects of mechanization Lpon the average rate of profit
is finally resolved —the LFTRP Is false. But is It? So far we
have only considered an economy from which fixed capital is
absent. In this context, the Oklshlo theorem is unquestionable:
if mechanization is undertaken the average rate of profit must
necessarily increase. It remains to be seen what happens when
the existence of fixed capital —which is the rule rather than the
exception— is taken into account. In a recent article, A. Shaikh
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(i978b) claims —although he does not offer a formal proof—
that the Oklshlo theorem breaks down in the presence of fixed
capital. Here we offer a simple theorem which seems to confirm
such a claim.
(1) Determination of Prices of Production. In Capital, vol.3,
Marx (1967:3:157) provides an unambiguous definition of price
of production in the presence of fixed capital. Price or produc
tion is cost-prlce (the per unit cost of production evaluated at
ruling prices) plus a percentage w (the average rate of profit)
of the unit investment h id out (not merely consumed) in pro
duction.^ This definition allows us to formulate the price of
production in the following manner —we continue with the fa
miliar two-sector economy. Let

be the physical amount of

fixed capital laid out in sector l (1=1,2) at the beginning of pe
riod t= i, and let Tj, be Its life. Hence, p ^ is the monetary val
ue of the fixed capital laid out in sector 1 (1=1,2) at time t= l.
Sqppose this equipment can turn out Nj units of output in each of
Its Tj years of life. Then the average depreciation per unit in
sector 1 (1=1,2) is p24r1/T 1N1=pzd 1. This means that in sector 1
(1=1,2) one w it of output absorbs an amowt p*dj of fixed capi
tal. It also absorbs an amowt paaaj+piolj of circulating capital.
Hence the cost-prlce Is given by padj+paaaj+ptwlj.
The am investment laid out in production consists of two
elements: the circulating capital and the fixed capital advanced
per out. The former we already know. To determine the latter,
notice that in sector 1 (1=1,2) an amoint p2$j of fixed capital is

advanced at the beginning of period t=l in which Nj units of out
put are produced. This means that in that sector and year an
amount pa'I'j/Nj of fixed capital Is advanced per w it of output.
That amowt drops to (p ^ /N j) [(Tj-1)/Tj] in year t=2* since
Pz$j/Tj of the original fixed capital depreciates during the first
year, etc. Over the Tj years of life of

w it advancements of

fixed capital decline as summarized in Table 1:

Table 1.
/Annual advancements of fixed capital per unit of output
t=i

(fVkj/Nj)

t=2

(p^j/NjHCTj-iJ/Tj]

t=3

(p^j/N pifT j-^/T j]

«

t=Ti

(pa^j/Nj) (1/Tj)

Notice that far any one year except the last (which in any
case is irrelevant because* properly speaking* there is no fixed
capital in It) the amount of fixed capital advanced per w it is
greater than the depredation per unit. Thus* the average of the
annual advances of fixed capital is also greater than the unit de
predation. Using that average

(1=1,2)] as a measure for
2

the amount of fixed capital advanced per w it, we can express
the w it Investment laid out in production as p^j+ paa^+ p,^
(1=1,2.) Hence the price of production in sector 1 (1=1,2) is
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given by p1=(padj-fpaai1+PiwJ1)+ir(pa^1+paaz1-fp,a>l1).
(2) Determination at the Average Rote at Profit, The above de
finition of price of production can be used to formulate the price
system. Since for our present purpose it is not necessary to
know the absolute prices, we may use the consumer goods as nu
meraire (pt=i)« so that we have
1= (pad 1+Paaai+wli) +7T(pa^i+paaai+wli)’

I4.a](4.b]

Pa= (pada+Paaaa+wlal +* (pate+Paeaa+wia),
The solution ( jr. p* } of this system provides the average rate
of profit and the relative price of capital goods under the ruling
technique of production { 0 . <t>, a^ .1^; (1=1.2)}. In order to find
that solution let us write equations [4.a] and [4.b] as follows:
l-tpadi+PaSai+wli)
rr=----------------------Pafli+PAt+wl,
[5.a][5.b]
P2~(pa0a+Pa3aa+&>ta)
V=-------------------------------

Pa0a+Pa3aa+wlj
It is shown in Appendix 3 that (1) Equation [5.a] intersects the

Ps-axls at (i-cjii)/(0i+a3i) and the ir-axls at

(2)

Equation [S.b] intersects the p2-axls at uia/[l-(0a+an)] and the

ir-axls at -1. (3) Equation [S.a] is monotonlcally decreasing su’d
equation [5.b] Is monotonlcally increasing. In addition, for the
system to be viable It must be the case that [(l-&>i,)/(di+azi)]>
(uli/[i-(0 2+ an )]). Therefore, one can derive the solution de-
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plcted In Figure 4.4 (below). Hence under the ruling technique
the average rate of profit is v0 and the relative price of capital
goods is pat0.

Figure 4.4.
Determination of the Average Rate of Prafu
(Fixed capital case)

l-o i,

(3) Effects of Mechanization Upon The Average Rate of Profit.
Suppose a technique (0% tf>\ a*. JP} that is cost-prlce-roducing
at ruling prices is introduced in sector 1 (1=1 or 2, or 1=1 and
2.) If the Innovation occurs in sector 1. we have
pa*3 1*+Pa°a*,*+Qli* <p*° 0 i+pst°a*i+wli

(6]

Multiplying by -1, adding 1 to both sides, and dividing the re
sulting Inequality by pz’d i’-tp^ast’ +uii*, we have
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i-(pa#0i*+pi*a«*+wii*i

i-(p*0di+p*0as,+«l,)

Pa#0i*+Pa°a«*+«ii*

P a ^ i'+ P a ^ + w J ,*

If it is indeed true —as Marx (1973:776-77) suggests— that
mechanization raises the investment cost per true of output, i.e.
if Pi°$i *+pj°aji*+cj1i p l + p j ^ u +wii • then {fc°<pi*+pa^a2 t*+<»>ii*
can be replaced with pz°$i+p/a3 i+a>ii in the right hand side of
[7] to yield**
i-(p*°$i“+Pi°a«*+wl!a) j. i-(p*°$i+|fcBan+a>l»)
p2B0i*+pn°a»j*+wii*

s

[8]

p*°^i+p»°a«+^ii

That is,
i* for f*=p,» * t"

[9]

This expression indicates that in sector 1, the transitional
rate of profit (i.e., the rate of profit which the innovative capi
talist would obtain at ruling prices) may be equal, greater, or
lower than the ruling average rate of profit. In terms of the
mathematics of the argument, expression [9] simply says that
In the new price equation of sector 1, the rate of profit at the
ruling prices may be equal, higher, or lower than the ruling
rate of profit. Referring once again to Figure 4.4, this means
that the Introduction of the new technique does not move [5.a] In
a determinate direction. Hence a position such as [5.a]* in Fig
ure 4.5. is possible, and 11 entails a lower average rate of prof
it. (See Figure 4.5. below.)
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Flgir*4.5
Effect of Sector i 's Mechanization upon the Average
Rate of PrafA (Fixed Capitol case)
A
V

03) Pa

Legend:
v°=rullng average rate of profit
irt ,*=ir* for pr=pz°, i.e. the transitional
rate of profit (in sector i)
Tr*=new average rate of profit

If the Innovation occtrs in the capital goods sector 0=2).
we have p » W ^ ^ * ^ V < P k 04a+pzWMa» and similar step6
to those followed above lead to the same conclusion. I.e. the
average rate of profit may fall. Finally, as indicated in Figure
4.6, if the innovation oocurs In both sectors simultaneously, the
same result applies. (This case Is a mere combination of the
preceding two.) Hence we have the following THEOREM:

ao

M the presence a f fixed capttal, tf (I) capitalists in
novate according to the criteria) af a lower cast af
production* and U 0 Che introduction af mars mecha
nized techniques raises the investment cast per unit
af output* then the effects of mechanization upon the
average rate of profit are theoretically indetermi
nate. Therefore the Oklshlo theorem Is false.

Figure 4.6
Effect of A General Mechanization upon the Average
Rate af Profit (Fixed Capital easel

Legend:
v°=rullng average rate af profit
irt.M
=transltianal rate af profit in
sector 1 (1=1,2)
ir*=new average rate of profit
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On THb Catftalict Criterion For Mechanization: A Lower Cost at
Production or A Higher Transitional Rate af Prafu?
Simple inspection of Figures 4.5 and 4.6 reveals the necessary
condition under which mechanization results in a lower average
rate of profit. That condition may be stated as follows:
Far mechanization to lower the average rate of prof
it, tt must also lower some or all of the transitional
rates of profIL
Is there any possibility that this condition will be met In
the real world? Traditional teachings suggest that there is none,
as those teachings assume that it would be irrational for any ca
pitalist to introduce a more mechanized technique so long as It
reduces his transitional rate of profit. However, the idea of ra
tionality that permeates this belief is too narrow. To see why,
consider the case of a technique { 6*, 0*, a*, P } which. In rela
tion to the ruling one [{ 6, 0, a, i }], lowers the unit cost of
production and the transitional rate of profit. According to the
traditional teachings, no capitalist should ever consider adopting
such a technique. Suppose, however, that one "Irrational” capi
talist Introduced It and began to cut prices. Now the others
must follow, or else they will be driven from the market. (Ac
complishing that outcome is precisely what the capitalist had in
mind. Moreover, since he did lower the price first, he might
have won same market share from his dormant rivals.) Obvi
ously, there is a lim it —determined as p1 for v=0— below
which prices camot be cut without incurring a loss. That limit,
however, is not the same for everyone. It Is lower for the
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['‘irrational” ] innovator because, with x=0, the prloe is the
cost-prlce, and this is lower for the new technique. It follows
that the Innovative capitalist can lower his price to a level
which rival capitalists cannot match without incurring a perma
nent loss. Hence they must begin to behave "irrationally” and
introduce the new technique, or else they will be driven from
the field, either because they ruin themselves or because they
lose their markets to the innovator. It thus seems that the tra
ditional wisdom has got its idea of rationality reversed.
Section Notes
*"The price of a commodity which Is equal to Its cost-prlce
plus the share of the annual average profit on the total capital
Invested (not merely consumed) in its production is called its
price of production. Take, for example, a capital of 500, of
which 100 Is fixed capital, and let 10% of this wear out during
ore turnover of the circulating capital of 400. Let the average
profit for the period of turnover be 10%. In that case the costprlce of the product created during this turnover will be 10c for
wear plus 400 (c+v) circulating capltal=410, and its price of
production will be 410 cost-prlce plus (10% profit on 500)50=
460" (Marx, 1967:3:150.)
o
The questions may be asked (1) why the use of linear de
predation, and 12) why measure the amoint of fixed capital ad
vanced per unit by the average of the actual annual advances.
The answer Is that no matter what formula for depreciation we
use, and no matter whether we measure the fixed capital ad
vanced per unit by its actual annual values or by the average of
those values, it is nonetheless truB that the fixed capital ad
vanced per unit is greater than the unit depreciation, and this,
as we will see, is tre relevant aspect In our argument.
This Is the well known proposition of increasing roundaboutness in production, which economists usually associate with
the name of Bohm-Bawerk. This Is a theoretical claim which not
everyone accepts (see, e.g., Blaug, 1985:506-23.)
^Multiply p2°da*+p2oa»*+wV<P 3O0 2 +PaBaj*+«Jk by -1, add
p2° to both sides, and divide the resulting Inequality by p*‘
pz'W+c^V. This yields tt* for p*=p*° n°.

k V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER TREATMENTS
OF THE FIXED CAPITAL MODEL
The formulation of the fixed capital price system presented in
the previous section differs from other treatments of the same
subject in the literature. The be6t example of the latter is pro
vided by Roemer (1979 and 1981). Specifically, he discusses
the LFTRP using a model in which fixed capital lasts forever.
Theoretically, such a procedure makes sense because —as he
explains— "the case of nondepreciating fixed capital is the polar
opposite of the pure circulating capital case" (Roemer, 1981:
119-20), for which the Oklshlo theorem doeG hold. Hence,
if the rate of profit can be shown to rise as a conse
quence of tecmlcal innovation In a model when flxBd
capital lasts forever, a fortiori it should rise when
fixed capital wears out, this latter case being in
some sense an average between the two polar cases
(Roemer, 1981:120.)
Roemer defines prices of production —which, for irknown
reason, he calls equilibrium prices— in the following way:
What is the equilibrium price vector p and the prof
it rate ir In this modal1/ It is the pair (jp, v) which
makes the present discounted value (PDV) of the rerevenue stream, from operating each process at unit
level, equal to zero" (Roemer, 1981:120.)
That is, using our two-sector model, *
PftpAj+Piwij)
(pif|+PAlip t« il) + ^
(i+ )*----- =0
a,
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(1=1,2),

(U
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whore { ^ / N j is the fixed capital input per unit of output
is the physical amount of fixed capital laid out in sector 1, and
Nj Is the number of inlts of output that this equipment t i m out
per period of production. Since we are assuming that fixed capi
tal lasts forever* ^ does not depredate, and hence

is con

stant over the infinite life span of die fixed capital.) Taking the
consumer goods as the numeraire (pF l), we have:
a, PffipAj+uij)
-(prf.+fWft+wV+S
7-----=0 [1=1,2 andpFi)

1

1

1 t= l

u + irr

[

2]

Since it is an identity that
oo
1
S .i (it*
.. ). r
t=

1
* ■

«

we can write [2] in the following form:
Pj-fpAj+wlj)

*=-----------------

[1=1,2 and pt=i)

[41

prfj+PAt+ulj

The solution of this system provides the average rate of profit
and ths relative price of capital goods, i.e. [x \ p»°] under the
ruling technique {

a^, i j ).

Stppose now that a new technique ( fja, a^*, i* } is found
for sector 1 [1=1 or 2, or 1=1 and 2.) Roemer puts to himself
this question: "What is the capitalists' Innovation criterion?" He

as

answers: They will adopt the new technique
If at current prices and rate of return, the stream of
discounted net revenues, is positive. That is,the ra
tional capitalist treating prices as given, adopts the
new tecmlque If and only if (Roemer, 1981:121.
Emphasis added):

-(p2°f1*+^1V + ^ < 1a) + ^

j—

i

>0 a= 1.2^,= l) [51

Using this criterion for innovation, Roemer proceeds to show
that the rata of profit must rise.
But of course 1 Let us examine Roomer’s criterion of Inno
vation in order to see what It actually amoints to. From [5] we
have, using the identity [3], that

tt°<--------------------

p ^ + a ^ + w lj*

=** for pa=p*°

(1=1,2 and p ,= i),

[6]

which shows that Roomer's innovation criterion Is actually the
following: The rational capitalist w ill introduce a now technique
If end only If it raises his transitional rota at profit 1
We have seen in the previous section that the [necessary]
condition far mechanization to lower the average rate of profit.
Is that it must also lower some or all of the transitional rates
of profits. Now Roemer tells us that mechanization will not
lower the rate of profit because capitalists do not mechanize
their Industries unless It raises their transitional rates of prof
it. But the question is w h/t For what reason will capitalists

as
behave m that way? Roemer provides no reason other than this:
because it is tautologlcally rational to do so. However, we have
also seen in the previous section that such an idea of rationality
is likely to end up with the capitalists who put it into practice
telrg driven out of the market. So much for Roemer’s definition
of rationality.
In addition to the above, there is also a serious problem
with Roemer’s formulation of the price system itself, which ap
pears to be an ''Illegitimate” invasion of neoclassical thinking
into the Marxian analytical framework. To see why, notice that
in order to define prices via the PDV method, as Roemer does
—see [1], one has to use some rate af discount. Roemer uses
the average rate of profit But Is this a legitimate choice? The
average rate of profit is an END RESULT of competition —and
therefore of mechanization itself, since competition is fought by
the cheapening of the commodities and this, in turn, is achieved
by the continual mechanization of production. Thus, the average
rate of profit is not something which is there "In the market”
for capitalists to see and use as a criterion for evaluating po
tential Innovations. The average rate of profit exists as a theo
retical can cept, but certainly not as a datum which capitalists
have available for their day-to-day calculations. Now, if for the
purpose of computing the present valuB of the future stream of
net revenue, capitalists cannot use the average rate of profit,
what will they use in its place? The answer Is, the rote af in
terest —which, contrary to the average rate of profit, is a
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dotun available at all times. All that capitalists need to do in
order to know it, is to ask the lenders of capital how much they
are about to charge on their loaned money. Marx (1967:3:368)
had all this very clean
The average rate of profit does not obtain as an estab
lished fact, but rather as an end result of the equa
lisation of opposite fluctuations. Nat so with the rate
at meanest. It is a thing fixed dally in its general, at
least local, validity —a thing which serves industri
al (...) capitals even as a prerequisite end a factor tn
the calculation of their operation. (Emphasis added.)
In light of this, the following question is warranted: When
using it as a rate of discount, is Roemer identifying the rate of
profit with the rate of interest? It does seam so. To see why,
let us formulate "equilibrium prices" a la neoclassical, using
the interest rate as rate of discount. Since we could not possi
bly do it better than a good neoclassical economist would do it,
we will use the words of R.L. Oouch (1972:67-69). Stppose
that a capitalist is evaluating a project which entails the use
flxBd

cepltal by the amount prfj per unit of output:
"[He] either has to borrow the money to pay for it, or [he]

has to use [his] own money (...) in which case [he] forgoes earn
ing the market rate of interest on that money (...) Whichever
way you look at It, then, the interest cost per period (either ex
plicit or forgone) is equal to the [cost of the fixed capital], i.e.
[pzfjr]. This is one part of the cost of buying the [flxBd capi
tal's] productive service. But it is not the whole cost. This
[fixed capital] wears out, or depreciates, over its n year life
time, and the entrepreneur has to allow for such depredation.
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When the [fixed capital] eventually wears out after n years the
entrepreneur wants to be able to replace it. He wants to have
set aside each period an amount of money d which will, at the
end of n years, have accumulated to the replacement price of the
[fixed capital]. Thus, apart from the interest cost per period
[prfjr] already discussed, there is a depreciation cost per pe
riod d to be calculated. How do you calculate d? (...) we wish
to set aside each year a unique amount d such that the total ac
cumulated at the end of n years is Just sufficient to replace the
[fixed capital]. That is (...},
d(l+r)n_1+d(l+rin"2+

+d(i+r)-Hi=[paelJ,

which yields
IPaffl
d=-------------

[7]

(l+r)n- l

Expression [7] is the depreciation cost that must be incurred
per period If the [cost of the fixed capital] Is to be recoiped
over Its working life. If we add to this the interest cost per pe
riod [patfjr] Incurred by buying the [fixed capital], we obtain
Ip JfJ
P = 1 ^ 1 + ------------

[8]

(i+r)n- i

In the above equation

is the total [cost] to the firm of thB
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capital services provided by [the fixed capital] per period**
Every period the capitalist will use, in addition to the fixed
capital, raw materials and labor (I.e. circulating cap'taO by the
amount piajj+piuij. Again, he must either borrow this money
or use his own, etc. H as the cost to him of the circulating ca
pital In each period is (i+rMpiauj+p,ul^. Adding this cost to
the cost of the fixed capital, we obtain

P aff

Pj=p*?ir+----------- + (1+ir) (paaxj+ptwlj)

(1=1,2) [9]

(i+ rp-1
In the case when the fixed capital lasts forever we have

ton ------------ =0,
(i+r)n-i
and therefore [9] reduces to
P p P a ty '+ d + r )

(pAj+Piwlj)

(1=1,2)

[10]

Now let us go bade to Roemer's formulation of prices as In [1].
Using the Identity [3] we obtain
Pj= P*fi*+ (1 +r>(paa&j+ptOJij)

0=1,2)

[ 11]

Simple inspection shows that ir in [11] corresponds with r in
[10]. Therefore, Roemer does indeed Identify the average rate

90

of profit with the rate of interest, thereby confusing prices of
production with the so-called neoclassical long-run equilibrium
prices —whatever these may mean.
This is a serious theoretical problem. Prices of produc
tion are the average of market prices, and hence —as already
mentioned— in the long-period they are "a prerequisite of supply, of the reproduction of commodities11 (Marx, 1967:3:198.)
If, however, the rate of interest is equal to the rate of profit,
then, an average (i.e., over the long-period), the industrial capi
talist who borrows capital and undertakes the Investment will
have no gain at all because the profit that he derives from his
entrepreneurial activity will have to be relinquished to the
lender of capital In the farm of interest payment. Now If that
were to be the case he would not uidertafce production at all —
which only goes to say that, whatever they may be, Roemer’s
neoclassical prices are not prices of production, sim ply because
m the long-period they camat ensure the reproduction of com
modities. For commodities to be reproduced over the long-run
—that Is to say, for capitalists to remain in business, there has
to exist a profit far the enterprise (Marx, 1967:3:374) after
all payments, including the payment of Interest, have been
made. This Implies that whatever profit a capitalist derives
from production must be sufficient both to pay back the interest
on the borrowed money and to leave a profit for the enterprise*
l.e "the average prefit =interest +proflt of enterpriser* (Marx,
1967:3:388. Emphasis added.) Hence, the rate of profit must
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be greater than the interest rate. The form in which Roemer
defines his "equilibrium prices*1 suggests that both the lender
and the borrower obtain the same average rate of profit on the
[loaned] capital. But this is all neoclassical nonsense. In the
real world, a capital of $100 Is a capital of $100 dollars. If
the average rate of profit is 10%, this capital will yield a profit
of $10 (=$100 times the average rate of profit of 10%), regard
less of who actually inrast It in the production of commodities.
If the Industrial capitalist who undertakes production owns the
$100 himself, he will keep the profit of $10. If he borrows the
$100 and the interest rate is 5%, then he will have to pay $5
(=$100 times the interest rate of 5%) to the ftnancltd capitalist
(the lender) from whom he has borrowed. Hence, he will keep
(profit of the enterprise) $5. As Marx (1967:3:353) puts It,
The profit is not doubled by the double existence of
the same sum of money as capital for two parsons.
It can serve as capital for both of them only by di
viding the profit.
There is only one situation in which abstracting from any quan
titative difference between the average rate of profit and the
rate of Interest may be theoretically sound, namely, when It is
assumed that there are no financial markets In the economy, so
that the distinction between financial and industrial capital is
superfluous. But, clearly, doing so is equivalent to abstracting
from capitalism Itself —and then any discussion concerning the
LFTRP (or anything else) Is mere theoretical dlvertlment.
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Section Notes
Notice that in the first period (period t=0) the capitalist
invests an amount p^,+pzaa,+p,cji. per uUt of output —prf. is
fixed capital and the rest is circulating capital. However* intbe
same period there is no revenue* since the output produoed in
that period is not sold until the next period. Thus we have:
Costs in period t=0, prfj+ pia^+p,^
Revenue in period t=0, none.
In period t=l* the wily cost is that of the circulating capital;
there Is no fixed capital cost because fixed capital lasts forever
and Its cost has already been paid in period t=0. In this period
(t=i) the output produced m period t=0 is sold* and hence we
lave revenue in period l=p.. Periods 2, 3* etc. follow the same
pattern as period t= l. Hence equation [1] In the text.
This problem has been mentioned by Shaikh in his illumi
nating exchange with the neo-Rlcardlans (see Shaikh* 1980.)
Our discussion of this lS6ua owes much to him, but it also owes
a great deal to Marx (1967: Chapters xxl-xxlll.). It is utfortunate that most of the discussion on Marx has concentrated on
his theory of value* and so little an issues such as the theory of
money and credit, to which the aforementioned chapters belong.
There is much one can learn from Marx's treatment of those
Issues.

t VI. CONCLUSION
It will be useful to clarify what has and has not been shown in
the preceding pages. It has not been shown that the Marxian
LFTRP is necessarily correct, and hence that Marx was right in
saying that under capitalism economic crises are unavoidable. It
has been shown, however, that no argument has so far been
given which allows us to say that the LFTRP is false. In parti
cular, It appears that the most appealing critique of the LFTRP,
namely the Gkishlo theorem, does not hold once the existence
of fixed capital is taken Into acount. Therefore the LFTRP re
mains a valuable theoretical hypothesis.
This result has important implications. On one hand, the
Marxian tradition which explains economic crises in light of the
LFTRP must be given the theoretical legitimacy denied to It In
recent years. On the other hand, the idea that economic crises
are for the most part the consequence of class struggle [I.e.,
the result of workers* high wage demands) is open to question.
This thesis Is used as a political weapon against organized labor
whenever the economy goes into recession. Somehow the impli
cation is that if workers wane to lim it their wage demands,
economic instability would be eliminated. The possibility that
the LFTRP rules the actual process of accumulation makes that
claim less persuasive. Perhaps It is not ' ‘unreasonable” wage
demands, but the continual accumulation of capital Imposed by
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the competitive nature of capitalism, which periodically throws
the economy into recession. In other wands, it may well be that
the very foundation of capitalism —i.e. the never-ending urge
to engage in competition, is not as benign as traditional teach
ings would lead us to believe.

APPEMHCES

APPEMMXI
THE EQUALITY BETWEEN VALUE AND PRICE UNDER
SIMPLE COMMODITY PRODUCTION
Let us restate the assumptions tftich characterize a society of
Simple Commodity Production: (1) The direct producers are in
possession of their means of production —each worker is an in
dependent producer, there is no labor market as such. (2) Each
producer (worker) commercializes his or her own outputs. (3)
It is implicitly assumed that every worker is capable of pro
ducing any commodity —this implies that the remweratlon per
hour of labor is the same in all economic activities.
Let us define:
Pj The price of commodity l (1=1,...,n)
y. The monetary cost of all the inputs other than direct la1 bor used ip per unit of commodity 1 (1=1...Mn)
1. The amount (#of hours) of direct labor necessary to pro
duce one unit of commodity 1 (1=1,...,n)
In these conditions, the im plicit monetary remweratlon per
hour of labor (W) is given by
h 'h
W=

,
*1

from which it follows that
PrYj+Wlj
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Now, the means of production and raw materials used to pro
duce one uilt of commodity l (l=i,...,n), and whose monetary
cost is Yj, are themselves produced with direct labor lj' and
other means of production and raw materials. Let the monetary
cost of the latter be y '. We have,
y ^ '+ W J j'

I2J

Substitution of [2] Into [1] yields
PpYj'+WijMMpYj'+WUj+ij'l
Similarly,
y ^ y /'+ W l" ,
and hence,
p,=Y1,/+Wil"+W (l1+l1')= y 1"+WU1+i1'+i1" ) .

etc. Following this algorithm of doted labor we can "go back"
until we reach the original Inputs, i.e., those whose production
has used up only direct labor. We will then have:

p1=WU1+i1'+V'+— 1
where (i1+i1/+i1/'+...) represents tha total amount of labor, di
rect and indirect, incorporated in one inlt of commodity 1 (1=
i,...,n) —lj is the direct labor and lj'+ Jj"+... is the Indirect
labor. Given any two commodities 1 and J, we have:
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p1=W(i1+JI'+JI"+ ....)

and hence,
i xi / 1 1 //.
p, V-Jj+J] +Pj

_

amoirt of tabor Incorporated in one
of commodity MLj)

J . + J / + i a m o t r t of labor incorporated tn one
J J J
unit of commodity J CLj)

Now we can choose as numeraire any commodity and define as
"unit’* of tha same commodity that amount of It which can be
produced with one hour of labor (direct and Indirect). In other
words, we choose as numeraire an amount of commodity n such
that in+ln'+!n/'+ ...= l. In this way, if the production of one init
of commodity 1 (l=i,...,n) requires Lj hours of labor, then its
price In terms of thB numeraire will be

Of course, we

can choose as numeraire the amount of gold (the money com
modity) which can be produced with one hour of labor (direct
and indirect) —thus prlce=value.

APPENDIX D
DETERMINATION OF THE AVERAGE RATE OF PROFIT
(Circulating capital case)
From equation [3.a] we have: For *=0, p2= (l-oil)/aai, there
fore equation [3.ad intersects the praxis at (i-u lj/a si. For
p*=0, x=(i-o>Ji)A>Ji, therefore equation [3.a] intersects the vaxls at (l-uljl/w lj. In addition, dir/dp2<0 trivially, since as p*
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increases the numerator of [3.a] decreases and the denominator
increases. Therefore. [3.a] is monotonlcally decreasing.
From equation [3.b] we have: Far jt=0, p ^ ix /U -a s ), and
hence equation [3.b] intersects the praxis at w ij/d-aa). For
pz=0. tt=-1, and hence equation [3.5] intersects the ir*axls at -1.
2

In addition, dir/dpz=^V '(aa p2+ul3) >0, therefore equation [3.b]
Is monotonlcally increasing.

A P P E N D I X III

DETERMINATION OF THE AVERAGE RATE OF PROFIT
(Fixed capital case)
From equation [5.a] we have that for pz=0 it is v=(i-6>ii)A>lu
hence [5.a] intersects the u-axls at

Also, for ir=0

It is p3=(l~u>ii}/(0i+aa]), hence [5.a] Intersects the praxis at
(l-^ it)/(di+a 2 t). In addition, dir/dp2<0 trivially, since as pj In
creases the numerator of [5.a] decreases and the denominator
increases.
From equation [5.b] we have that for pr=0 It is n= -l, and
hence [S.b] intersects the ir-axls at -1. Also, for ir=0 it is p*=
w .k/lH 0*+a^], hence [5.b] intersects the pn-axls at o>lz/[l(dj+an)]. In addition,

dir

(l+fo-Oalulz

— = -------------------------- T

dpz

since

[pa(0a+a«)+cjij

>0,

Hence, equation [5.b] is monotonlcally Increasing.
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